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Abstract
This thesis consists of three interrelated chapters on adaptive learning. In each chapter,
I investigate the way in which adaptive decision makers/players behave in the long run. In
particular, I consider subjective assessment maximizers; each player assigns a subjective
assessment to each of his actions based on its past performance and chooses the action
which has the highest assessment. They update their assessments adaptively using realized
payoffs. I mainly focus on the following three cases; (1) an adaptive decision maker takes
into account not only direct payoff information, but also foregone payoff information;
(2) adaptive players face a normal form game with strict Nash equilibrium in each of
infinitely many periods; and (3) adaptive players face a finitely repeated game in each of
infinitely iterated periods. Then I show the conditions under which (1) adaptive decision
maker chooses the optimal action, (2) adaptive players end up choosing Nash equilibrium
strategies, and (3) adaptive players’ behavioural strategies converge to an agent quantal
response equilibrium, which is a quantal response equilibrium for extensive form games.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Adaptive learning has attracted many theoretical and experimental researchers. Their
research helps us to understand how people learn and how they behave in the long run
when they face the same situation repeatedly. Yet there exist many aspects which are
important and have not been investigated thoroughly. The purpose of this thesis is to
provide theoretical investigation and insights on such aspects.
In this PhD thesis, I investigate the long run behaviour of adaptive decision makers
in a decision problem and games. I consider the situation where they play the same game
or decision problem repeatedly but have limited information about their environment;
they do not know the payoff functions or the opponent players. They assess each of their
available actions based on past payoff information and pick the action which has the
highest assessment.
In Chapter 2, I provide a theoretical prediction on the way in which an adaptive agent
with foregone payoff information behaves in the long run. In the model, when the agent
updates his assessments of actions in an adaptive manner, he uses not only the objective
payoff information, but also the foregone payoff information, which may be distorted.
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The distortion may arise from pessimism/optimism or envy/gloating; which depends on
how the agent views the source of the information. This chapter shows the conditions in
which the assessment of each action converges, where the limit assessment is the average
of the expected objective and distorted payoffs. It is also shown that the agent chooses
the optimal action most frequently in the long run if the expected distorted payoff of the
optimal action is greater than the expected distorted payoffs of the other actions. The
relations of this model to experience-weighted attraction learning, stochastic fictitious
play, and quantal response equilibrium are also considered.
In Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which the adaptive
players in games with strict Nash equilibrium behave in the long run. In this model, each
player updates his assessment of the chosen action only in an adaptive manner. Almost
sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium is shown under one of the following conditions:
(i) that, at any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, there exists a player who receives
a payoff which is less than his maximin payoff, (ii) that all non-Nash equilibrium action
profiles give the same payoff. I show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in
the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes game; the stag hunt
game; and the first order statistic game. While in the game of chicken and market entry
games, players may end up playing the maximin action profile.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the way in which adaptive players who play a finitely
repeated game in each of infinitely iterated periods behave in the long run. In this model,
each player assigns subjective assessments on his actions after any history. After receiving
payoffs, they update their assessments of chosen actions using the realized payoffs in an
adaptive manner; in particular, I consider the Q-learning updating rule introduced by
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Watkins and Dayan (1992) and Sarin and Vahid (1999) updating rule. When players
experience emotional shocks on their assessments, players’ behaviour strategies converge
to the agent quantal response equilibrium introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)
if the stage game has perfect information. For the general case, I provide an additional
condition to guarantee convergence. When players do not experience the shocks, in the
long run, I show the following results; (1) when they play the finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, both players may end up cooperating in each stage game, and (2) when they
play a finitely repeated coordination game, both players coordinate in each stage game.
In Chapter 5, I summarize the work and discuss some potential extensions of this
work.
3
CHAPTER 2
AN ADAPTIVE LEARNING MODEL WITH
FOREGONE PAYOFF INFORMATION
2.1 Introduction
We often learn not only from our own experiences but also from others. For example,
consider the adoption of new agricultural technologies by farmers, where they face new
fertilizers. Since they are not familiar with the new technologies, they do not know the
possible outcomes from each fertilizer or the way in which the outcomes are realized. It is
common that farmers have neighboring farmers who face the same decision problem, which
may facilitate him to find other farmers who have chosen the different fertilizers. Then
the farmers can learn from other farmers about the outcomes from the other fertilizers.
This chapter studies the behaviour of an agent who has limited information about his
decision-making environment; he knows the available actions, however he may not know
all the possible outcomes of each action or how the outcome is realized. When we face
such a complicated problem, it is natural for us to simplify the problem. In this chapter,
I consider an agent who simplifies the problem in the following way; based on past payoff
information, he assigns a subjective assessment to each action, where the assessment of
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each action represents the payoff which he expects to receive from the action, and picks
the action which he thinks gives the best payoff. Before choosing an action, he experiences
temporary random shocks on his assessments; therefore, he picks an action which has the
highest shock-affected assessment. The shocks may be interpreted as emotional noise on
his evaluations.
When updating his assessments adaptively, the agent uses the payoff information not
only from his own experience but also from others. However, the information from oth-
ers need not be treated in the same way as the direct payoff information. For instance,
when a farmer cannot directly observe what the other farmers have received, he may
believe that his neighbors exaggerate (depreciate) the effect of other fertilizers. Then he
discounts (increases) the effectiveness and takes the discounted (increased) payoff infor-
mation into account. In another example, when a farmer observes others’ payoffs, he
may envy his neighbors’ outcomes which are better than his outcome, while he gloats
over their outcomes when his outcome is better than theirs. In these cases, he takes into
account increased foregone payoff information when he envies and discounted foregone
payoff information when he gloats. Hence it is reasonable to assume that when the agent
processes the foregone payoff information, the information may be distorted, depending
on the way in which he views the source of the information.
I first show the conditions in which the assessments of all actions converge. I use
a stochastic approximation method and approximate a trajectory of assessments by the
solution of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Then I show the conditions under
which the ODEs have a unique rest point to which the assessments converge, where
the limit assessment of each action is an average of the expected objective and distorted
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payoffs. Next, given the limit assessments, I provide conditions in which the agent chooses
the optimal action most frequently in the long run. I show that if the expected distorted
payoff of the optimal action is higher than the ones of other actions, then he chooses the
optimal action most frequently in the long run. In particular, if (1) the distortion function
for each action is an affine map and (2) the agent envies and/or gloats over other agents’
payoffs, then the agent chooses the optimal action most frequently. However, I also show
the case in which he picks a non-optimal action most frequently; it happens when the
agent distorts his forgone payoff information of the non-optimal action more upwardly
than the one of the optimal action.
In addition, I show the necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to the quantal
response equilibrium proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). At the quantal response
equilibria, given payoff perturbations, players pick the action which has the highest ex-
pected perturbed payoff, where the expectation is derived from the equilibrium strategy.
Since the decision problem here can be considered as a 2-player game in which a player
plays against nature, if all the subjective assessments converge to the expected objective
payoffs, then the agent’s choice probabilities converge to the quantal response equilibrium
of this model. I show that this happens if and only if the expected distorted payoff is
equal to the expected objective payoff for each action; there is no distortion on average
for each action, that is, the distortion function is mean preserving.
Camerer and Ho (1999) provide a model of agents’ behaviour with foregone payoff in-
formation, where the model is called the experience-weighted attraction (EWA, hereafter)
learning model. The differences between the EWA learning model and this model are the
way in which decision makers treat the foregone payoff information and their method of
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updating their assessments. In Camerer and Ho (1999), decision makers observe or can
infer the foregone payoff and they take into account the discounted payoff. In this chapter,
I investigate the relationship between this model and the EWA learning model of Camerer
and Ho (1999) and show that this model becomes equivalent to the EWA learning model
when (1) the agent in this model discounts the foregone payoff information by a discount
factor δ and (2) the discount factor for the previous experiences, ρ, and the discount
factor for the previous attraction, φ, in the EWA learning model are equal: ρ = φ = 1.
In addition, if δ = 1, then this model incorporates the stochastic fictitious play model of
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993). For both cases, I show that the agent chooses the optimal
action most frequently in the long run.
The model of the adaptive agent in this chapter is proposed by Heller and Sarin
(2001), which is based on Sarin and Vahid (1999) (SV, hereafter)1. The differences of the
model in this chapter and theirs are that the agent in SV does not have access to payoff
information about actions which are not chosen by the agent, while the agent in Heller
and Sarin model does not experience stochastic emotional shocks in the assessments.
Therefore, this model can be considered as an extension and complement of the analysis
of Heller and Sarin (2001). It is worth to note that since the decision of the agent in this
model is affected by emotional shocks, he may not pick the action which has the highest
assessment; it happens when the emotional noise of the chosen action is so big that the
noise-affected assessment of the action is greater than the ones of the other actions, even
though the assessment of the chosen action is not the highest. It is shown that there exists
a case in which the noise makes the agent to choose the optimal action most frequently;
1The use of SV model, rather than other learning models such as Erev and Roth (1998), is supported by
some empirical work (See, Sarin and Vahid, 2001; Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2008; Chen and Khoroshilov,
2003).
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without the noise, as in Heller and Sarin (2001), the agent may not end up choosing the
optimal action.
There also exist other related models with emotional shocks in games, but the following
authors do not consider the effect of foregone payoff information. Leslie and Collins (2005)
investigate games played by the same type of agents in this model, payoff-assessment
maximizers, with a slightly different assessment updating rule. They show that in 2-player
partnership games and 2-player zero sum games, strategies converge to Nash distribution,
which is a Nash equilibrium under stochastic payoff perturbations. Cominetti, Melo and
Sorin (2010) investigate the model with stochastic perturbations which have the extreme
value distribution. They show that with the parameters in specific ranges, the choice
probabilities of players converge to a Nash distribution in general games.
Some experimental and empirical literature shows the importance of foregone payoff
information for decision makings. Conley and Udry (2010) investigate learning by farmers
in Ghana about fertilizer use and show that their decisions are influenced by their neigh-
bors’ decisions. Duffy and Feltovich (1999) investigate the effect of foregone payoffs in the
ultimatum game and the best-shot game and show that players show different behaviors
with and without foregone payoff information. Grosskopf et al. (2006) investigate the ef-
fect in decision problems with foregone payoffs, showing that foregone payoff information
affects decision maker’s behaviour but the difference of his behaviour with and without
foregone payoff disappears as he gains experience, except in cases where alternatives are
correlated to each other.
There are some evidence showing that foregone payoffs are in fact distorted. Camerer
and Ho (1999) show that in median-action games and beauty contests, foregone payoffs
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are discounted from actual payoffs. Using their experimental data, Grosskopf et al. (2006)
estimate parameters in generalized fictitious play with discount factor on foregone payoff
and show that the foregone payoff is actually discounted. It is worth to note that dis-
counting is not the only way that people distort the foregone payoff information. Grygolec
et al. (2012) show that in a lab experiment, agents’ evaluations on lotteries are affected
by the outcomes of other agents; their envy and gloating affect their evaluations.
2.2 The Model
I consider an agent who faces the same decision problem repeatedly. In each period,
n ∈ N, he picks an action from the set A = {1, 2, ...,M}. After picking an action,
the agent receives a payoff; let (Ω,F , P ) be the probability space on which all random
variables are defined and piin : Ω → R be the payoff function of action i in period n.
I assume that the environment is stationary and thus E[piin] = E[pi
i
m] =: E[pi
i] for any
n,m ∈ N and i ∈ A, where E[pii] denotes the expected payoff of action i. I assume
that the payoff function for each action is bounded. In this model, he knows the action
set and observes his own realized payoffs but he does not know the state space, realized
state or his payoff function. In period n, he assigns a subjective assessment on each
action: Qn = (Q
1
n, ..., Q
M
n ) denotes the assessments of actions in period n, where Q
i
n is
the assessment of action i in period n. Before choosing an action, he receives stochastic
emotional shocks on the assessments; the random vector of the emotional shocks for all
actions, η = (η1, ..., ηM), takes a value in RM and the distribution of η does not depend
on his payoff or his assessments. After the stochastic emotional shocks on the assessments
of all actions are realized, the agent chooses the action which has the highest total value
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of the assessment and the realized shock. Therefore, the probability of choosing action i
given his assessments is as follows:
Ci(Q) = Pr
(
arg max
j∈A
(Qj + ηj) = i
)
,
where Ci : RM → [0, 1] is a mapping which specifies a probability of choosing action i
for each assessment Q and can be a correspondence. I assume that the distribution of
the stochastic noise η has a strictly positive density on the domain, so that Ci becomes
a continuous function 1. One example of this type of choice probability is the logit
choice rule, which is derived by the i.i.d. shocks with the extreme value distribution of
F (ηi) = exp(− exp(− 1τ ηi)); the logit choice rule has the following form:
Ci(Q) =
exp( 1
τ
Qi)∑
j∈A exp(
1
τ
Qj)
,
where τ is sometimes called “noise term” 2. Note that (i) if τ approaches infinity, then
the choice probability becomes the uniform distribution and (ii) if τ approaches 0, then
the choice probability approaches the degenerate probability; the probability of the action
with the highest assessment becomes 1 and 0 for the other actions 3.
After receiving a payoff in each period, the agent updates his assessments using the
payoff information; he updates the assessment of chosen action using the realized payoff,
while he updates the assessments of the other actions using the foregone payoff informa-
1For example, consider the case where ηi = 0 with probability one for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Then if Q1 = Q2,
then the choice probability that the agent chooses i depends on his tie break rule and Ci may become
discontinuous or a correspondence.
2See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)
3If there exist more than two actions which have the highest assessment, then those actions are chosen
equally.
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tion, which may be distorted. Assume that the agent has chosen an action j 6= i and the
payoff of action i, pii, is realized, where he cannot observe the payoff. Let Di : R → R
be the distortion function of the payoff from action i. Therefore, Di(pii) is the distorted
payoff information of action i, which has not been chosen by the agent.
I assume that the distortion function is bounded. Another reasonable assumption on
distortion function is that the function is monotonically non-decreasing1, so that it weakly
preserves the order of objective payoffs; if x > y then Di(x) ≥ Di(y). If the inequality
holds with equality, then the agent cannot distinguish precisely the foregone payoff from
the objective payoff realization x and y. Since the distortion function cannot distort the
order, the agent can still receive meaningful information. An additional assumption on
action i ’s distortion function is that the other actions’ payoff realizations do not affect
the extent to which the payoff information of the action i is distorted2.
Using the objective payoff information and foregone payoff information, the agent
updates his assessment on each action in the following manner:
Qin+1 =

(1− λn+1)Qin + λn+1piin if action i is chosen in period n
(1− λn+1)Qin + λn+1Di(piin) otherwise
where {λn}n≥1is a deterministic sequence of weighting parameters satisfying the fol-
lowing condition: ∑
n≥1
λn =∞,
∑
n≥1
(λn)
2 <∞.
These assumptions on weighting parameters indicate that the effect by which new
1However, the result in the analysis here does not depend upon this assumption.
2This assumption is relaxed in the later section by introducing an envy-and-gloating distortion func-
tion.
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information affects next period’s assessment (i) decreases over time, which captures the
power law of practice, but (ii) does not disappear in the later periods. Note that the sum
of the sequence of frequentist’s weighting parameters, λn =
1
n
for each n ∈ N, satisfy the
conditions. To clarify this argument, it may be helpful to rewrite the updating rule as
follows:
Qin+1 = Q
i
n + λn+1(1i,n(pi
i
n −Qin) + (1− 1i,n)(Di(piin)−Qin)) (2.1)
= Qin + λn+1(1i,npi
i
n + (1− 1i,n)Di(piin)−Qin)
for each i ∈ A, where 1i,n = 1 if action i is chosen in period n, and 0 otherwise.
It is worth noting the relation between this model and the experience-weighted at-
traction (EWA hereafter) model introduced by Camerer and Ho (1999). Under some
parameters, the updating rule of the assessments in this model coincides with the up-
dating rule of the attractions in EWA learning model. Since choice rules of this model
and EWA learning model coincide under the logistic choice rule, the two models become
equivalent when the assessments correspond to the attractions. To find such parameters,
the general updating rule of EWA model should be described here.
Let Nn be the discounted number of past experiences and let A
i
n be the agent’s at-
traction to action i. The updating rules of both variables are described as follows. For
the variable Nn,
Nn+1 = ρNn + 1,
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where the parameter ρ is the discount factor of previous experience. For Ain,
Ain+1 =
φNnA
i
n + 1i,npi
i
n + (1− 1i,n)δpiin
Nn+1
,
where the factor φ is the discount factor for previous attraction, while the factor δ is the
discount factor for foregone payoff.
I consider the case where ρ = φ = 1. Then the updating rule of Ain is expressed as
follows:
Ain = A
i
n +
1
Nn+1
(1i,npi
i
n + (1− 1i,n)δpiin − Ain).
If we have Ain = Q
i
n, λn =
1
Nn
and Di(pii) = δpiin, then this EWA updating rule is
equivalent to the updating rule in this model. Since the choice rule given attractions in
EWA learning model is equivalent to the logit choice rule given assessments in this model,
EWA learning model coincides with this model. In addition, if δ = 1, then this model is
parallel to the stochastic fictitious play model by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993).
2.3 Limit Assessments
To investigate the agent’s behaviour in the long run, I show that with probability one,
the assessment of each action converges to an average of expected objective and distorted
payoffs, which is the sample mean of directly and indirectly observed payoffs of the action
in the limit1.
The proof of this claim is motivated by the argument in Cominetti, Melo and Sorin
(2010); while notice again that players in their model do not observe foregone payoff
1The formal statement is given in Theorem 1, which is located just before the next section.
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information and therefore the dynamics of players’ assessments are different.
To prove this claim, I use a stochastic approximation method and show that the
ordinary difference equations (2.1) can be approximated in the long run by the solution
of the following ordinary differential equations (ODEs, hereafter);
Q˙it = C
i(Qt)E[pi
i] + (1− Ci(Qt))E[Di(pii)]−Qit, i ∈ A, (2.2)
where Q˙it :=
d
dt
Qit.
Let Q˙it = Fi(Qt) and F = (F1, ..., FM). In Lemma 1, I provide the condition by which
(i) F is Lipschitz continuous and (ii) there exists a unique rest point for ODEs (2.2).
Lemma 1. (i)F = (F1, ..., FM) is Lipschitz continuous and (ii) there exists a unique rest
point of ODEs (2.2) if the following condition holds: for any Q and Q ′
| Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) || E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |≤ δi‖Q−Q′‖∞, (2.3)
for all i and some δi ∈ [0, 1), where ‖ · ‖∞ is the infinity norm.
Proof. (i) Let i be the action such that the following condition satisfies:
‖F (Q)− F (Q′)‖∞ =
∣∣(Qi −Qi′) + (Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])∣∣ .
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Then we have
‖F (Q)− F (Q′)‖∞ =
∣∣(Qi −Qi′) + (Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])∣∣
≤ ∣∣Qi −Qi′∣∣+ δi‖Q−Q′‖∞
≤ (1 + max δi)‖Q−Q′‖∞,
where δmax := maxj δj ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, F is Lipschitz continuous.
(ii) Consider the function f = (f 1, f 2, ..., fM) such that
f i(Q) = E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
for each i ∈ A. Notice that f(Q) − Q = F (Q) = Q˙. Let i be an action such that
‖f(Q)− f(Q′)‖∞ =| f i(Q)− f i(Q′) |. Then
‖f(Q)− f(Q′)‖∞ = | f i(Q)− f i(Q′) |
= | (−Ci(Q) + Ci(Q′))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii]) |
= | Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) || E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |
Now by the hypothesis, there exists δi ∈ [0, 1) such that
| Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) || E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |≤ δi‖Q−Q′‖∞
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for all i. Then we have
‖f(Q)− f(Q′)‖∞ = | Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) || E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |
≤ δi‖Q−Q′‖∞
≤ max
j
δj‖Q−Q′‖∞.
Since δmax := maxj δj ∈ [0, 1), f is a contraction mapping and by the contraction mapping
theorem, Q = f(Q) has a unique solution. Hence, if condition (2.3) is satisfied for all
actions, then ODEs Q˙ have a unique rest point.
In the following arguments in this section, I assume that condition (2.3) holds. If
E[Di(pii)] 6= E[pii] for all i, then condition (2.3) tells us that the choice probability func-
tion C = (C1, ..., CM) : RM → [0, 1]M is also Lipschitz continuous. It is helpful for
understanding condition (2.3) to consider the case where emotional shocks have the ex-
treme value distribution, so that the choice probability becomes the logistic choice rule:
Ci(Q) =
exp( 1
τ
Qi)∑
j exp(
1
τ
Qj)
.
Proposition 1. In the logistic choice rule case, condition (2.3) holds if the following
condition holds;
| E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] | ·M < τ (2.4)
for each i.
Proof. Consider the difference of the choice probabilities of action i for two different
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assessment vectors Q and Q′. We have
| Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) |=| exp(
1
τ
Qi)∑
j exp(
1
τ
Qj))
− exp(
1
τ
Qi′)∑
j exp(
1
τ
Qj′)
| .
By the mean value theorem, there exists Q∗ such that
| Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) | = |
∑
j
∂
∂Qj
Ci(Q∗)(Qj −Qj′) |
≤
∑
j
| ∂
∂Qj
Ci(Q∗) || (Qj −Qj′) |
≤
∑
j
1
τ
| (Qj −Qj′) |
≤ M
τ
‖Q−Q′‖∞.
From the second line to the third line, I use the fact that | ∂
∂Qj
Ci(Q) |≤ 1
τ
for any Q and
j. Hence if | E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |< τ
M
, then
| Ci(Q)− Ci(Q′) || E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] |
≤ | E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] | M
τ
‖Q−Q′‖∞
= δi‖Q−Q′‖∞,
where δi =| E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] | Mτ ∈ [0, 1).
Condition (2.4) says that the noise term τ should be great enough to cover the product
of (i) the difference between the expected objective and distorted payoffs and (ii) the size
of the action set. Therefore, if one of them becomes greater, then τ should also be greater,
that is, his choice probabilities approach the uniform distribution.
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Next, I show that a “continuous interpolated trajectory” of the assessments almost
surely approaches the solution of ODEs (2.2). In the following argument, I mostly
follow the notation and methods in Borkar (2008). Let t0 = 0, tn =
∑n
i=1 λi and
In := [tn, tn+1], n ≥ 0. Then a continuous interpolated trajectory Q t is expressed as
follows:
Qt = Qn + (Qn+1 −Qn)
t− tn
tn+1 − tn , t ∈ In.
Let Q≥st , t ≥ s, denote the unique solution of (2.2) starting at s;
Q˙≥st = F (Q
≥s
t ), t ≥ s,
with Q≥ss = Qs, s ∈ R. Similarly, let Q≤st , t ≤ s denote the unique solution to (2.2)
ending at s;
Q˙≤st = F (Q
≤s
t ), t ≤ s,
with Q≤ss = Qs, s ∈ R. Then, we have the following result:
Lemma 2. For any T > 0,
lim
s→∞
sup
t∈[s,s+T ]
‖Qt −Q≥st ‖∞ = 0 a.s., and
lim
s→∞
sup
t∈[s−T,s]
‖Qt −Q≥st ‖∞ = 0 a.s..
Proof. First I rewrite the updating rule above as follows;
Qin+1 −Qin = λn+1
(
Fi(Qn) + Un+1,i
)
, for each i ∈ A,
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where
Fi(Qn) = E[pi
i]−Qin + (1− Ci(Qn))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii]),
and
Un+1,i =
(
piin −Qin + (1− 1i,n)(Di(pii)− piin)
)
− Fi(Qn).
Now F = (F1, ..., FM) is a Lipschitz continuous map from RM to RM , and Un = (Un,1, ..., Un,M)
are random perturbations such that
E[Un+1 | Qn] = 0
and
sup
n
E[‖ Un+1 ‖2∞| Qn] ≤ K,
where K <∞ is a constant. Note that supn ‖ Qn ‖∞<∞, since the initial assessment for
each action takes a finite value and the payoff function and distorted payoff function are
also bounded. The second condition is also true since the choice probability, payoff func-
tion and distorted payoff function are bounded. Therefore, by Lemma 1 in Borkar (2008),
the solution of ordinary difference equations (2.1) for the assessments is approximated in
the long run by the solution of ODEs (2.2) almost surely.
Note that the rest point of ODEs (2.2), Q∗ = (Q1∗, ..., QM∗), is the vector of the
assessments where each action’s assessment is an average of the expected objective and
distorted payoffs of the action;
Qi∗ = Ci(Q∗)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q∗))E[Di(pii)], i ∈ A,
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where the average is taken by the limit choice probability of the action.
In Lemma 3, I show the global convergence of assessments to the unique rest point of
ODEs (2.2). To show convergence, I use the Lyapunov function method:
Lemma 3. Given any initial assessment Q1, the assessments of actions converge to the
unique rest point of ODEs (2.2) almost surely: for any Q1, Qn
a.s.→ Q∗
Proof. Consider the function
V0(Q) =‖ Q−Q∗ ‖∞,
where Q∗ is the unique rest point of (2.2). This function is 0 when Qi = Qi∗ for all i and
strictly positive otherwise. Note that the derivative of V0 coincides with the derivative
of | Qi − Qi∗ | of the action i which takes the highest value among all actions. First, I
assume that Qi > Qi∗. Then
d
dt
V0 =
d
dt
(Qi −Qi∗)
= (f(Qi)− f(Qi∗) +Qi∗ −Qi)
≤ δmax ‖ Q−Q∗ ‖∞ −(Qi −Qi∗)
= (δmax − 1) ‖ Q−Q∗ ‖∞
< 0.
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Next, I assume that Qi ≤ Qi∗. Then
d
dt
V0 =
d
dt
(Qi∗ −Qi)
= −(f(Qi)− f(Qi∗) +Qi∗ −Qi)
≤ δmax ‖ Q−Q∗ ‖∞ −(Qi∗ −Qi)
= (δmax − 1) ‖ Q−Q∗ ‖∞
< 0.
Thus we have d
dt
V0 < 0 for all Q 6= Q∗. Hence V0 is a Lyapunov function for ODEs (2.2)
and, by Proposition 6.4 and Corollary 6.6 of Bena¨ım (1999) or Theorem 2 and Corollary
3 of Borkar (2008), assessments converge to the unique Q∗ almost surely.
Since there exists a density function for each shock and choice function, 1i,n, is
bounded, the choice probability function for each action is continuous with respect to
assessments. Hence the convergence of assessments implies the convergence of choice
probabilities. In addition, by the strong law of large numbers for dependent variables1,
the empirical frequency of each action, 1
n
∑n
m=1 1i,m, converges to the choice probability
given the limit assessments, Ci(Q∗), almost surely.
Lemma 4. With probability 1, the empirical frequency of each action converges to the
choice probability of the action in the limit; for each i,
1
n
n∑
m=1
1i,m
a.s.→ Ci(Q∗).
Proof. Let {1i,n, n ≥ 1} be a sequence of choice functions such that 1i,n = 1 if i is chosen
1For example, see p36 in Hall and Heyde (1980)
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at period n and 0 otherwise. Let {Fn, n ≥ 1} be a sequence of σ-fields, where Fn is
generated by random variables for all actions up to period n. Thus 1i,n is measurable with
respect to Fn and E[1i,n | Fn−1] = Ci(Qn). Now for each x and n ≥ 1, E[|1|] = 1 < ∞
and P (|1i,n| > x) ≤ P (|1| > x). Notice also that E[|1| log+ |1|] = 0 < ∞. Thus by
Theorem 2.19 in Hall and Heyde (1980), we have
1
n
n∑
m=1
[1i,m − Ci(Qm)] a.s.→ 0.
Since Ci(Qn) converges to C
i(Q∗) almost surely, the empirical frequency of action i con-
verges to Ci(Q∗) almost surely. Since I pick i randomly, this argument is true for any
i ∈ A.
Now we are ready to state one of the main results;
Theorem 1. Given condition (2.3), with probability one, the assessment of each action
converges to the average of the expected objective and distorted payoffs where the average
is taken by the limit frequency of the action; for any Q1,
Qn
a.s.→ Q∗
and
Qi∗ = αi∗E[pii] + (1− αi∗)E[Di(pii)], ∀i ∈ A,
where αi∗ := limn→∞ 1n
∑n
m=1 1i,m.
In the following sections, using the results in this section, I show the conditions under
which the decision maker chooses the optimal action most frequently in the long run.
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2.4 Empirical Frequencies in the Long Run
In this section, I focus on the properties of the limit empirical frequencies of actions. I
show that if the expected distorted payoff of the optimal action, which has the highest
expected objective payoff, is greater than the expected distorted payoffs of the other
actions, then the agent chooses the optimal action most frequently in the long run. I also
show a case where the agent chooses a suboptimal action most frequently in the long run;
it happens when, on average, the foregone payoffs of the suboptimal action are distorted
more upward than the distorted foregone payoffs of the optimal action.
By the results in the last section, we know that αi∗ ≥ αj∗ if Ci(Q∗) ≥ Cj(Q∗). In
addition, we assume that stochastic shocks are i.i.d., such as the case for the logit choice
rule, and then Ci(Q∗) ≥ Cj(Q∗) if Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗. Therefore, in the following statements, I
analyze conditions under which Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗ holds; given the conditions, we have αi∗ ≥ αj∗
as well.
First, I assume that one action gives better payoff information than another action on
average: the expected values of directly and indirectly observed payoffs from one action
are greater than the ones of another action. As shown, each assessment in the long run can
be expressed as the average value of expected objective and distorted payoffs. Hence, if
those two values of one action are bound to be higher than those values of another action,
then the former action’s limit assessment is higher than another action’s limit assessment,
which means that the former action are chosen more frequently than the latter action in
the long run:
Lemma 5. If min{E[Di(pii)], E[pii]} ≥ max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]} holds, then αi∗ ≥ αj∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The following corollaries are immediate consequences of Lemma 5.
Corollary 1. If min{E[Di(pii)], E[pii]} ≥ max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]} holds for all j ∈ A, then
action i is chosen most frequently in the long run almost surely.
Corollary 2. If E[pii] = E[Di(pii)] for all i ∈ A, then αi∗ ≥ αj∗ if E[pii] ≥ E[pij].
Corollary 2 says that if distortion functions for all actions are mean-preserving, then
the action which has higher expected objective payoff will be chosen more frequently in
the long run.
Second, I consider the case in which foregone payoffs of some actions are distorted
upward and their expected distorted payoffs are greater than the expected objective pay-
offs. In this case, the action which has a greater expected objective payoff is chosen more
frequently in the long run.
Lemma 6. Suppose that E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)] ≥ E[pii] ≥ E[pij]. Then αi∗ ≥ αj∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
Third, I consider the case where foregone payoff information is distorted downward
for some actions. It is also shown that the action with higher expected objective payoff
is chosen more frequently in the long run.
Lemma 7. If E[pii] ≥ E[pij] ≥ E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)], then αi∗ ≥ αj∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the preceding results, it can be shown that the optimal action is chosen most
frequently if the expected distorted payoff of the action is greater than the ones of the
other actions;
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Theorem 2. Suppose that E[pii] ≥ E[pij] for some i and j. If E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)]
then αi∗ ≥ αj∗. Therefore, the optimal action is chosen most frequently in the long run,
αi∗ ≥ maxj αj∗, with probability one if E[Di(pii)] ≥ maxj E[Dj(pij)].
It is worth to note that it is not the case if the agent does not experience the emotional
shocks on his assessments as in Heller and Sarin (2001). As an example, consider the case
where there are only two actions, i and j. Also, for simplicity, I assume that there is no
uncertainty for payoffs; the agent receives a constant payoff pih from action h ∈ {i, j}. In
particular, I assume that pii > pij. Then if he chooses the suboptimal action, j, then he
receives the payoff pij while he observes the foregone payoff information of Di(pii). If the
initial assessments of action i and j are such that pii > pij > Qj > Qi > Di(pii) > Dj(pij)
then he always chooses action j.
Last, I consider the case where one action with lower expected objective payoff is
chosen more often than another action with higher expected objective payoff. It happens
when the foregone payoff of the worse action is distorted more upwardly, so that the
expected objective and distorted payoffs of the better action is lower than the expected
distorted payoff of the worse action. I show that if the arithmetic average of the expected
distorted and objective payoffs of the worse action is greater than the maximum value of
the expected objective and distorted payoffs of the better action, then in the long run the
worse action is chosen more frequently with probability one.
Proposition 2. If
E[Di(pii)] > max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]} > min{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]} > E[pii]
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and
E[Di(pii)] + E[pii]
2
≥ max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]},
then αi∗ ≥ αj∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.4.1 Affine Transformation
In this subsection, I consider the following distortion function; for each i ∈ A
Di(pii) = βpii + γ,
where β ≥ 0 and γ ∈ R. This distortion function is an affine map and includes the
case where the agent distorts the foregone payoff information by β ≥ 0 and γ = 0, as
in the EWA learning model1. Note that if E[pii] ≥ E[pij] then E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)].
Therefore, if the distortion function for each action is an affine map, then the optimal
action is chosen most frequently in the long run;
Corollary 3. If Di(pii) = βpii + γ for each i ∈ A, then αi∗ ≥ αj∗ if E[pii] ≥ E[pij].
Note that for the case where γ = 0, as in the EWA learning model, the action with
the highest expected objective payoff is chosen most frequently.
2.4.2 Envy and Gloating
Next, I consider a distortion function which captures the concept of the decision maker’s
envy and gloating. In this subsection, I assume that the agent directly observes not only
1They use δ for the discount factor.
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the payoff from chosen action, but also the payoffs from the other actions which are chosen
by others. Then the decision maker envies other people’s payoffs when the decision maker
observes others’ payoffs which are better than his, while he gloats over others’ payoffs
which are worse than his. One way to express this idea is that he distorts the foregone
payoffs upward when he envies, while he distorts the foregone payoffs downward when he
gloats. It is worthwhile noting that increasing the foregone payoff means that the action
is more likely to be chosen, while discounting the foregone payoff means that the action
is less likely to be chosen in the next period.
I first consider a situation in which the agent receives a payoff of an action, pii, while he
observes a foregone payoff of another action, pij. Let Dj(pij, pii) be the distortion function
of action j when action i is chosen. Then I consider the following distortion function1:
Dj(pij, pii) = pij +Gji (pi
j − pii),
where the function Gji , which expresses envy and gloating, is increasing and bounded
and satisfies the following condition: Gji (pi
j − pii) ≥ 0 if pij − pii > 0, Gji (pij − pii) = 0 if
pij−pii = 0, and Gji (pij−pii) ≤ 0 if pij−pii < 0. For example, a linear function Dj(pij, pii) =
β(pij − pii) with a slope β > 0 satisfies the conditions2.
Then the distortion function Dj(pij) has the following form:
Dj(pij) =
∑
i∈A\{j}
1i,nD
j(pii, pij)
=
∑
i∈A\{j}
1i,n(pi
j +Gji (pi
j − pii)).
1See equation (1) of Gygolec, Coricelli and Rustichini (2012)
2Boundedness is also satisfied, since I assume that payoffs are bounded
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Now consider the updating rule of the assessment of an action, given the envy-and-gloat
distortion function. For simplicity, and as assumed in Grygolec et al. (2012), I assume
that there are only two actions available1. Then the updating rule of the assessment of
action i is as follows:
Qin+1 = Q
i
n + λn+1(1i,npi
i
n + (1− 1i,n)Di(pii)−Qin)
= Qin + λn+1(1i,npi
i
n + (1− 1i,n)(pii +Gij(pii − pij))−Qin)
Notice that given the information in period n, payoff functions in period n and choice
functions are independent. Thus, this extension of the distortion function does not change
the dynamics of assessments.
Therefore I investigate the long run behaviour of this agent by comparing the limit
assessments. From Theorem 2, we know that assuming E[pii] ≥ E[pij], action i is cho-
sen more frequently if E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)]. Given the envy-and-gloating distortion
function, the expected distorted payoff of action i is as follows;
E[Di(pii)] = E[pii] + E[Gij(pi
i − pij)].
In particular, as assumed in Grygolec et al. (2012), I consider the envy-and-gloating
distortion function with
Gij(pi
i − pij) = β(pii − pij)
with a slope β > 0 for any i and j. Then the expected distorted payoff is expressed as
1If there are more than two actions, then we will have different dynamics for assessments. The case is
left to be pursued in future work.
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follows;
E[Dj(pij)] = E[pij] + β(E[pij]− E[pii]).
It is easy to see that assuming E[pii] ≥ E[pij], the inequality
E[pii] + β(E[pii]− E[pij]) ≥ E[pij] + β(E[pij]− E[pii])
holds when β ≥ 0. Hence the agent with the envy-and-gloating distortion function chooses
the optimal action most frequently in the long run.
Next, I consider a class of envy-and-gloating distortion functions, which includes the
envy-and-gloating distortion function above. I first assume that the function Gij does not
depend on which action is chosen;
Gij(x) = G(x)
for actions i, j ∈ A. This means that the degree of decision maker’s envy and gloating
does not depend on which action is chosen, but the distance of his and other’s payoffs. I
next assume that the distortion function G is an odd function;
G(−x) = −G(x).
This means that given two payoffs, the degree of envy is equivalent to the degree of
gloating, but envy and gloating have the opposite effect. Note that the envy-and-gloating
function above satisfies both conditions. Then the agent chooses the optimal action most
frequently in the long run if the function G is convex;
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Proposition 3. If there exist two actions and the function G is convex, then the agent
chooses the optimal action most frequently in the long run:
αi∗ ≥ αj∗ if E[pii] ≥ E[pij].
Proof. See Appendix.
2.5 Quantal Response Equilibrium
I investigate the relationship of this model with the quantal response equilibrium model1
introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). For the purpose, the quantal response equi-
librium model is introduced here. Let Aι be a finite set of actions for player ι ∈ {1, 2}:
Aι = {1, 2, ...,Mι}. Let piι : A1 × A2 → R be a payoff function for player ι. Let
∆ι = {pι = (pι1, ..., pιMι) :
∑
j pιj = 1, pιj ≥ 0} be the set of probability measures of
player ι, where pιj is the probability of player ι playing action j. The domain of the
payoff function can be extended to the set of probability measures ∆ = ∆1 ×∆2 and let
p = (p1, p2) be an element of ∆. When choosing action j, player ι receives a stochastic
payoff, ηιj. The random vector ηι = (ηι1, ..., ηιMι) takes a value in RMι . The assumptions
of stochastic payoffs here are equivalent to the assumption of the stochastic shocks in
the model of this chapter except that E[ηj] = 0 for all j ∈ Aι and ι ∈ {1, 2}. Given
the opponent’s choice probability p−ι, the player ι who uses j receives the following total
payoff:
piι(j, p−ι) = piι(j, p−ι) + ηιj.
1The decision problem can be considered a game in which the decision maker plays against nature,
which chooses its action, which corresponds to the states, with a fixed probability. Therefore, it is possible
to compare this model with the quantal response equilibrium model, which is introduced for games.
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Given the total payoffs for actions, player ι picks action j such that piι(j, p−ι) ≥
piι(k, p−ι) for all k ∈ Aι. Therefore, given the opponent’s choice probability p−ι, the
probability of choosing j is as follows:
C ′j(piι, p−ι) = P (arg max
k∈A
(piι(k, p−ι) + ηιk) = j)
Then quantal response equilibrium is a choice probability profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2) such
that for any ι and j,
p∗ιj = C
′j(piι, p∗−ι).
If I set player 2 as nature and his actions as states, then this model can be considered
as a decision problem for player 1. In this case, the nature picks a state ω randomly
from A2 = Ω, where the distribution corresponds to p2, and pi1(j, p2) corresponds to the
expected payoff of action j, E[pij]. Therefore, the choice probability of action j is expressed
as follows;
C ′j(piι, p−ι) = Cj(E[pi]) = P (arg max
k∈A
(E[pik] + ηk) = j).
Since the choice probability for each action in this model is continuous with respect
to assessments, if Qjn converges to E[pi
j] for each j, then the choice probability of each
action converges to a quantal response equilibrium. Since the choice probability is always
positive, by ODEs (2.2), the necessary and sufficient condition of the convergence point
being the quantal response equilibrium is E[Dj(pij)] = E[pij] for all j, which means that
each distortion function should preserve the mean of each payoff function. Therefore, this
proves the following result:
Proposition 4. If the choice probabilities and the empirical frequencies of actions con-
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verge, then the convergence point is a quantal response equilibrium if and only if E[Dj(pij)] =
E[pij] and E[ηj] = 0 for all j ∈ A.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has investigated theoretically the behaviour of a myopic and adaptive agent
who simplifies his decision problem; to each action, he assigns a subjective assessment
which is a weighted average of past realized payoffs, experiences an emotional shock on the
assessment and picks the action which has the highest noise-affected assessment. Payoff
information which is used to update his assessments is not only directly observed payoff
information, but also foregone payoff information, which may be distorted. It is shown
by using a stochastic approximation method that the limit assessment of each action is
an average of expected objective and distorted payoffs. Given the limit assessments, the
tendencies of the decision maker’s behaviour in the limit are studied; the agent chooses the
optimal action most frequently if the expected distorted payoff of the action is greater than
the ones of the other actions. It is also shown that seeing the decision problem as a game
against nature, the choice probabilities of the agent almost surely converge to a quantal
response equilibrium if and only if he distorts his forgone payoff in a mean-preserving way.
2.6.1 Population Interpretation
This model can also be interpreted as a population model. Consider the situation in
which there exists a continuum population of agents, who have limited information about
the decision problem they face; they are to choose an action, but do not know the state
space, realized state, and payoff function. In each period, an agent is picked from the
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population randomly, chooses an action from the set A and receives a payoff. Once he has
been picked, he never makes a decision again. In each period, the population forms public
assessments on actions, Qi = (Q1, ..., QM), which are based on the payoff information
informed by agents. The public assessments are observed by all agents. In addition,
each agent has his own assessments on those actions. The individual assessments are
independently drawn by the common distribution which is equivalent to the distribution
of emotional stochastic shocks in the model. Given the agent’s assessment and public
assessments, he chooses an action which has the highest total value of public assessment
and his own assessment. Therefore, the probability that action i is chosen by the agent
in period n is as follows;
Ci(Qn) = Pr
(
arg max
j∈A
(Qj + ηj) = i
)
,
where η = (η1, ...., ηM) is the sequence of the individual assessments of the agent in a
period. After making a decision, each agent informs the population of his received payoff.
Moreover, the population can acquire the foregone payoff information from the other
information sources. The population may incorporate the foregone payoff from others in
the distorted way, as defined in the model. It is also possible that the foregone payoff
information itself is distorted. Then the population updates the public assessments in the
adaptive way which I have defined in this model;
Qin+1 =

(1− λn+1)Qin + λin+1piin if action i is chosen
(1− λn+1)Qin + λin+1Di(piin) otherwise,
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where piin is the payoff which is realized in period n and D
i(piin) is the distorted payoff
information of action i in period n. Therefore, the public assessments consist of the payoff
information from its own agents and from others. For example, the public assessment of
each action is the sample average of realized payoffs if λn =
1
n
,∀n and Di(x) = x,∀i.
To understand the argument further, consider a specific situation where there exist
similar goods from different brands and consumers need to decide from which brand they
will purchase. Those consumers may visit a web page which collects payoff information
or reviews from its viewers. The page may also collects reviews from other web pages,
however, the editor of the page may believe that the reviews from the other web pages
may be distorted and he distorts the information from other pages. Then given the payoff
information from its own consumers and from others, the page shows the public assessment
which is an (weighted or sample) average of undistorted and distorted payoff information.
Each consumer also has his own assessment and he therefore picks the brand which has
the best value of public assessment and his own assessment. This chapter shows that the
public assessment of each brand converges and consumers will end up picking the right
brand most frequently when the distortion is non-discriminatory among brands.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Lemma 5
For each action, i, the following equation holds;
Qi∗ = Ci(Q∗)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q∗))E[Di(pii)].
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Hence if min{E[Di(pii)], E[pii]} ≥ max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]} holds, then
Qi∗ = Ci(Q∗)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q∗))E[Di(pii)]
≥ Cj(Q∗)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q∗))E[Dj(pij)]
= Qj∗.
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Here, I prove by contradiction. First, I consider the case where E[Di(pii)] > E[Dj(pij)] ≥
E[pii] ≥ E[pij] holds. Assume that Qi∗ −Qj∗ < 0. Since E[pii] ≥ E[pij], we have
E[pii] = Qi∗ − (1− Ci(Q∗))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
≥ Qj∗ − (1− Cj(Q∗))(E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij]) = E[pij].
Note that since Qi∗ < Qj∗, we have
E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij] ≥ E[Di(pii)]− E[pii]. (2.5)
Now, since E[Di(pii)] > E[Dj(pij)], we have
E[Di(pii)] = Qi∗ + Ci(Q∗)(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
> Qj∗ + Cj(Q∗)(E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij]) = E[Dj(pij)].
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And by the hypothesis Qi∗ < Qj∗, we have
E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] > E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij]. (2.6)
However, the inequalities (2.5) and (2.6) contradict each other.
Next, I consider the case where E[Di(pii)] = E[Dj(pij)] = E[pii] ≥ E[pij] holds. Since
the limit assessment of each action takes a value between the expected objective and
distorted payoffs, we should have that Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗.
Last, I consider the case where E[Di(pii)] = E[Dj(pij)] > E[pii] ≥ E[pij] holds. Again,
I assume that Qi∗ < Qj∗. Since E[Di(pii)] = E[Dj(pij)], we have
Qi∗ + Ci(Q∗)(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
= Qj∗ + Cj(Q∗)(E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij]).
However, this equation does not hold, since Qi∗ < Qj∗, Ci(Q∗) < Cj(Q∗) and 0 <
E[Di(pii)]− E[pii] ≤ E[Dj(pij)]− E[pij].
2.7.3 Proof of Lemma 7
I assume that one of the following inequalities,
E[pii] ≥ E[pij] ≥ E[Di(pii)] ≥ E[Dj(pij)],
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holds strictly. Also I assume that E[Dj(pij)] > 0. Consider some Q1 such that Q
i
1 ≥ Qj1
for any j 6= i. Then
Ci(Q1)E[pi
i] + (1− Ci(Q1))E[Di(pii)] ≥ Cj(Q1)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q1))E[Dj(pij)].
What I show here is that the trajectories of ODEs starting from the points with Qi1 = Q
j
1
never enter the area of Q with Qi < Qj so that at the unique rest point Q∗, which is
globally asymptotically stable, we should have that Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗. First, consider the initial
point Q1 such that
Qi1 = Q
j
1 ≤ Cj(Q1)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q1))E[Dj(pij)]
≤ Ci(Q1)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q1))E[Di(pii)].
Note that Q˙i ≥ 0 and Q˙j ≥ 0 and if Q˙i = 0, then Q˙j = 0. Otherwise, Q˙i > 0 and Q˙j ≥ 0,
0 ≤ C
j(Q1)E[pi
j] + (1− Cj(Q1))E[Dj(pij)]−Qj
Ci(Q1)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q1))E[Di(pii)]−Qi ≤ 1.
Therefore, the trajectories starting from Q1 do not enter the area with Q
i < Qj. Next, I
assume that
Cj(Q)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q))E[Dj(pij)] < Qi = Qj
≤ Ci(Q)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q))E[Di(pii)].
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Then Q˙j < 0 and Q˙i ≥ 0 and it is obvious that the trajectories of the ODEs do not enter
the area with Qi < Qj. Finally, I assume that
Cj(Q)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q))E[Dj(pij)] ≤ Ci(Q)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q))E[Di(pii)]
< Qi = Qj.
Then Q˙i < 0, Q˙j < 0 and
1 <
Cj(Q)E[pij] + (1− Cj(Q))E[Dj(pij)]−Qj
Ci(Q)E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q))E[Di(pii)]−Qi .
And again, the trajectories of the ODEs also do not enter the area with Qi < Qj. In sum,
the trajectories which start from the points on the line with Qi = Qj never enter the area
of Q with Qi < Qj and thus Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗. This argument can be applied to the other cases
where E[Dj(pij)] ≤ 0.
2.7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that Qi∗ < Qj∗. By the property of choice rules, we have that Ci(Q∗) < Cj(Q∗)
and hence Ci(Q∗) < (1− Ci(Q∗)). Since Ci(Q∗) < 1
2
, we have
Qi∗ = E[pii] + (1− Ci(Q∗))(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
≥ E[pii] + 1
2
(E[Di(pii)]− E[pii])
=
E[Di(pii)] + E[pii]
2
.
38
Since Qj∗ ≤ max{E[Dj(pij)], E[pij]}, we have Qi∗ ≥ Qj∗. However, this condition contra-
dicts the original hypothesis.
2.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the difference of Qi∗ and Qj∗. Then
Qi∗ −Qj∗ = E[pii]− E[pij] + (1− αi∗)E[G(pii − pij)]− (1− αj∗)E[G(pij − pii)]
= (E[pii]− E[pij]) + (1− αi∗)E[G(pii − pij)] + αi∗E[G(pii − pij)]
= (E[pii]− E[pij]) + E[G(pii − pij)].
Since E[G(pii − pij)] ≥ G(E[pii] − E[pij]) ≥ 0 if E[pii] ≥ E[pij], we have that Qi∗ ≥ Qi∗ if
E[pii] ≥ E[pij]. This means that αi∗ ≥ αj∗.
39
CHAPTER 3
AN ADAPTIVE LEARNING MODEL IN
COORDINATION GAMES
3.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, learning models have received much attention in the theoretical
and experimental literature of cognitive science. One such model is fictitious play, where
players form beliefs about their opponents’ play and best respond to these beliefs. In
fictitious play model, players know the payoff structure and their opponents’ strategy
sets.
Whereas there are other learning models where players have limited information; play-
ers may not have information about payoff structure, opponents’ strategy sets, or they
may not even know whether they are playing against other players. In the situation, they
may not be able to form beliefs about the way that the opponents play or all possible
outcomes. What they do know is their own available actions and the results from the
previous play, that is, the realized payoffs from chosen actions. Instead of forming beliefs
about all possible outcomes, each player makes a subjective assessment on each of his
actions based on the realized payoffs from the action and tends to pick the action which
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has achieved better results than the others in the past.
One such model with limited information is the reinforcement learning model intro-
duced by Erev and Roth (1998) (ER, hereafter), where they model the observed behaviour
of agents in the lab1. In their model, agent chooses an action randomly, where the choice
probability of the action is the fraction of the payoffs realized from the action over the
total payoffs realized for all available actions2.
In another learning model which is introduced by Sarin and Vahid (1999) (SV, here-
after), players make a subjective payoff assessment of each of his actions, where the
assessment is a weighted average of past payoffs, and they choose the action which has
the highest assessment. After receiving a payoff, each player updates the assessment of
chosen action adaptively; the assessment of chosen action is adjusted toward the received
payoff3.
In this chapter, I provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which myopic players
in the SV model4 behave in the long run in general games, mostly in coordination games,
which are of interest to a wide range of researchers5. In this model, the initial assessment
of each action is assumed to take a value between the maximum and the minimum payoff
that the action can provide6. For instance, players may have experienced the game in
advance so they may use their knowledge of previous payoffs to form an initial assessment
1There also exists work which has invesitgated their model theoretically. For instance, see Beggs
(2005) and Laslier et al. (2001).
2Since the payoffs are assumed to be positive, each player increases the probability of choosing an
action whenever the action is chosen.
3It is worth to note that if the realized payoff of an action is lower than the assessment of the action,
then the chance of the action being chosen in the next period becomes less likely.
4Note that the players do not observe the foregone payoff information and do not update the assess-
ments of unchosen actions. Therefore, the learning dynamics here is different from the one introduced in
Chapter 2.
5As examples of experimental works on coordination games, Cooper, DeJoung, Forsythe and Ross
(1992) and Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) have investigated which among multiple Nash equilibria,
is the one played in the lab.
6See also Sarin (1999) for the justification of the assumption.
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of each action. Given those initial assessments, each player picks the action which has
the highest assessment; in this chapter, each player does not experience any stochastic
perturbations on his own assessments.
After players have played a game and received the payoffs, each player updates his
assessment using the realized payoff; the new assessment of a chosen action is a convex
combination of the current assessment and the realized payoff. In the present chapter, the
weights on the realized payoffs are assumed to be random variables, meaning that players
are not sure how much they incorporate the new payoff information into their assessments,
which may be also affected by their mood. As a special instance, I also consider some
cases where those weights are non-random variables. For example, I consider players
who believe that the situation they are involved in is stationary so that each action’s
assessment is the arithmetic mean of its past payoffs. I also consider the case where
players believe that the environment is non-stationary and put the same weight on all
new payoff information.
Since the initial assessment of each action is smaller than the best payoff that the
action can give, each player increases his assessment of the action when he receives the
best payoff. If one action profile gives the best payoff to all players and they play it in
some period, then players will keep choosing the action profile in all subsequent periods. I
call an action profile absorbing state if once players play the action profile in some period,
then they play it in all subsequent periods.
Furthermore, there exist other cases where players stick to one action profile. One
such case is that their assessments of other actions become so low that the actions are
never tried again. Another case is that payoffs from the action profile are greater than the
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other assessments and players keep playing the action profile, even though it does not give
them the best payoffs. It is shown that each pure Nash equilibrium is always a candidate
of the convergence point, that is, for each strict Nash equilibrium there exists a range
of assessments for all players and actions such that players stick to the Nash equilibrium
forever. In addition, if (i) at any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, at least one player
receives the payoff which is less than his maximin payoff, or (ii) all non-Nash equilibrium
action profiles give the same payoff, then players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium
with probability one.
To see this in detail, I consider 2×2 coordination games and one non-2×2 coordination
game. In 2×2 coordination games, since only two actions are available for each player, I
can divide them into three categories according to the numbers of action profiles at which
each player receives the payoff which is strictly greather than the other possible payoffs
from his current action. Since each player receives the best payoff from his current action,
he never changes his action; note that such an action profile is absorbing. Notice also that
the number of such action profiles ranges from zero to two in 2 × 2 coordination games.
The class of coordination games with two absorbing states includes the battle of the
sexes and pure coordination games, where two absorbing states correspond to pure Nash
equilibria. The class of coordination games with one absorbing state can be subdivided
into the following cases: (1) the absorbing state corresponds to a Nash equilibrium; and
(2) the absorbing state corresponds to one non-Nash equilibrium action profile. The
class of coordination games in case (1) includes the stag hunt game, while the class of
coordination games in case (2) includes the game of chicken and market entry games.
Then I show the following results. In coordination games with two absorbing states, (i) if
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the maximin actions of both players coincide, then they end up playing a Nash equilibrium
with probability one, (ii) if maximin actions do not coincide for both players, then players
end up playing a Nash equilibrium or the maximin action profile with probability one. In
coordination games in case (1), players end up playing a Nash equilibrium with probability
one if the maximin actions of both players coincide. In coordination games in case (2),
players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium or a maximin action profile.
In a non-2×2 coordination game introduced by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990)
(VHBB, hereafter), each player is asked to pick a number from a finite set. If players fail
to coordinate, the player who picks the smallest number among players’ choices receives
the highest payoff. In addition, each number gives a better payoff when the choice is
closer to the smallest number among all the players’ choices. I show that each Nash
equilibrium, in which players coordinate to pick the same number, is absorbing1. It is
also shown that the smallest number of the players’ choices weakly decreases over time.
Next, I consider the case where the second best payoff from each action is lower than the
payoff from the maximin action, which is the smallest number of their choice set. Hence,
players are better off if they choose the smallest number of their choice set when they fail
to pick the smallest number among the players’ choices. In this case, I show that players
end up playing a Nash equilibrium with probability one, which can be also observed in
the experimental results by VHBB.
1It is absorbing if the minimum number gives different payoffs for opponents’ choices. If it gives the
same payoff for any opponents’ choice, then I have to assume an inertia condition for players’ tie break
rule for the corresponding Nash equilibrium to be absorbing. See the following argument.
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3.1.1 Literature review
In this chapter, I investigate convergence properties of SV learning model in mainly co-
ordination games. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, Sarin (1999) shows that players end
up playing for mutual cooperation or mutual defection. In this chapter, players do not
experience any stochastic emotional noise on their assessments, whereas SV also investi-
gate a decision problem in which a decision maker experiences the stochastic shocks on
his assessments in each decision period. Then SV show that (1) assessment of the ac-
tion which is played infinitely often converges in distribution to a random variable whose
expected value is the expected objective payoff and (2) if one action first-order stochas-
tically dominates the other, then the former action is played more often than the other
on average. In the context of SV leanring with the shocks in games, Leslie and Collins
(2006) investigate the model with slightly different updating rules and show convergence
of strategies to a Nash distribution1 in the partnership game and the zero-sum games.
With the SV updating rule, Cominetti, Melo and Sorin (2010) show the general conver-
gence result when each player’s choice rule is the logistic choice rule. They show that
players’ choice probabilities converge to a unique Nash distribution if the noise term of
the logistic choice rule for each player is big enough. By a property of the logistic choice
rule if its noise term becomes large then the choice probability approaches a uniform dis-
tribution. Hence, players in their model are more likely to choose an action which does
not have the highest assessment each time. However, players in the SV model without
emotional shocks do not choose the actions; they always pick the action which they think
is the best based on past payoff realizations. In this chapter, even the lack of exploration,
1Nash distribution is Nash equilibrium under stochastic perturbations on payoffs. If the expected
values of the perturbations are 0, then Nash distribution coincides with the quantal response equilibrium
proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)
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it is shown that players end up playing a Nash equilibrium in several coordination games.
Lastly, some authors have provided empirical supports of this model. For instance,
Sarin and Vahid (2001) show that the SV model can explain the data by ER at least
as well as the ER model does. Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) show that among learning
models comprising the ER model, the SV model, and the experience-weighted attraction
learning model by Camerer and Ho (1999), the SV model can best explain the data in
coordination games and cost sharing games.
3.2 General Games
There are M players who play the same game repeatedly over periods. Let N = {1, ...,M}
be the set of players. In each period, n ∈ N, each player chooses an action from his own
action set simultaneously. Let Si be the finite set of actions for player i ∈ N . After all the
players choose actions, each player receives a payoff. If players play (si)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NSi, then
player i’s realized payoff is denoted by ui(si, s−i), where s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sM).
When choosing an action, each player does not know the payoff functions or the environ-
ment in which he is involved.
In each period, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments on his actions; let
Qin(s
i) ∈ R denote player i’s assessment on action si in period n. Let Qin = (Qin(si))si∈Si
be the vector of assessments for all actions for player i. I assume that the initial assessment
for each action and each player takes a value between the maximum and the minimum
value that the action gives; thus,
Qi1(s
i) ∈ (min
s−i
ui(si, s−i),max
s−i
ui(si, s−i)),
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for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si. If mins−i ui(si, s−i) = maxs−i ui(si, s−i), then I assume that
Qi1(s
i) = mins−i u
i(si, s−i) = maxs−i ui(si, s−i).
In each period, each player chooses the action which he believes will give the highest
payoff; given his assessments, he chooses the action which has the highest assessment in
the period. Therefore, if si∗n is the action that player i chooses in period n, then
si∗n = arg max
si
Qin(s
i).
For a tie break situation, which arises when more than two actions have the highest
assessment, I introduce two types of tie break rules. I say that a tie break rule satisfies
the inertia condition if the rule picks the action which was chosen in the last period; if
actions which have the highest assessment were not chosen in the last period, then the
rule picks one of the actions randomly. As a comparison, I also introduce another tie
break condition, the uniform condition, where the rule picks each of the actions which
have the highest assessment with equal probability. In the following argument, I specify
a tie break rule if the result depends on the tie break rule; otherwise, the results do not
depend on the tie break rule assumption.
After playing the game in each period, each player observes only his own payoff;
players observe neither their opponents’ actions nor their payoffs. Given his own realized
payoff, each player updates his assessment of the action chosen in the previous period.
Specifically, if player i receives a payoff uin(s
i, s−i) when players play (si, s−i), then he
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updates Qin as follows;
Qin+1(s
i) =

(1− λin(si))Qin(si) + λin(si)uin(si, s−i) if s i is chosen in period n
Qin(s
i) otherwise
where λin(s
i) is player i’s weighting parameter for action si in period n. I assume
that λin(s
i) is a random variable which takes a value between 0 and 1; λin(s
i) ∈ (0, 1).
It reflects the idea that players are uncertain how far to incorporate the new payoff
information into their new assessments. The uncertainty can also be interpreted as players’
emotional shocks. How far they incorporate the new payoff information depends on their
random mood. I also assume that the sequence of weighting parameters, {λin(si)}i,n,si is
independent among periods, players and actions and it is identically distributed among
periods. I assume that the weighting parameter λin(s
i) has a density function which is
strictly positive on the domain (0, 1) for all i and si.
3.3 Results
In this section, I investigate the convergence results in general games. In later sections,
I focus on specific games, in particular coordination games. I say (si)i∈I is absorbing if
once players play the action profile in a period then they play it in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 5. If (si)i∈I is such that (i) for all i,
ui(si, s−i) = max
t−i∈S−i
ui(si, t−i)
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and (ii) for all i there exists r−i such that
max
t−i∈S−i
ui(si, t−i) > ui(si, r−i)
then (si)i∈I is absorbing.
Proof. Consider the case where players pick the action profile (si)i∈I in some period n.
In the case, player i receives the payoff ui(si, s−i). Note that the value ui(si, s−i) is the
maximum value that action si can give; therefore, by condition (ii), player i inflates the
assessment of the action si. Since the assessments of other actions do not change in the
next period, player i plays action si in period n+ 1 again. Since this logic can be applied
to other periods and I pick player i randomly, players play the same action profile in all
the subsequent periods.
If the inertia condition is always assumed for each player’s tie break rule, then condition
(ii) in Proposition 5 is not required. However, if the uniform condition is assumed, without
condition (ii), players may not converge to play one action profile. As an extreme example,
if two actions give the same payoff for any opponents’ actions and the payoff is higher
than any other payoffs that any other action can give, then he plays those two actions
with equal probability forever.
From Proposition 5, it is easy to see that even action profiles which consist of dom-
inated strategies for all players can be absorbing. To see this, assume that two players
play the prisoner’s dilemma game which has the following payoff matrix;
where the strategy ”C” is strictly dominated by the strategy ”D” for both play-
ers. Notice that at (C,C), both players receive the highest payoffs from the action ”C”;
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C D
C 1,1 -1,2
D 2,-1 0,0
ui(C,C) = maxs−i∈{C,D} ui(C, s−i) for for both players. Hence, if players play (C,C) once,
then they always play it afterwards1.
In the next statement, I show that player i stops playing an action if the assessment
of the action becomes smaller than the minimum payoff that another action can give;
Proposition 6. If Qin(s
i) < mins−i u(t
i, s−i) in some period n for ti 6= si, then player i
does not choose si after period n.
Proof. From the fact that Qin(t
i) > mins−i u(t
i, s−i), we have the fact that Qin(t
i) > Qin(s
i).
Notice that si is not chosen in period n. Since the assessment of the chosen action is a
convex combination of realized payoff and the assessment of the previous period with
λin ∈ (0, 1) for all i and n, we have Qin+1(ti) > mins−i u(ti, s−i). Notice also that si is not
chosen in period n and thus the assessment of the action is unchanged in the next period
n + 1. Therefore we have Qin+1(t
i) > mins−i u(t
i, s−i) > Qin+1(s
i) and player i will not
choose si in period n+ 1. The same logic can be applied in later periods and thus player
i will not choose si in any subsequent periods.
Once the assessment of one action becomes lower than the worst payoff from another
action, then the action will not be chosen forever. Therefore, if the worst payoff from
one action is greater than the best payoff from another action, then the latter action is
never chosen at any time. One natural question is whether players end up playing a strict
Nash equilibrium. In the following statement, I show that for any strict Nash equilibrium,
1See Sarin (1999) for the result.
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there exist assessments for all players such that the players end up playing the strict Nash
equilibrium:
Proposition 7. For any strict Nash equilibrium, there exist assessments in period n
for all players such that they play the Nash equilibrium in the period and all subsequent
periods.
Proof. Let (si∗)i∈N be a strict Nash equilibrium and si∗ be player i’s strategy at the strict
Nash equilibrium. Then, we have the following condition; for all i ∈ N ,
ui(si∗, s−i∗) > ui(ti, s−i∗) (3.1)
for all ti 6= si∗. I assume that in period n, the following conditions for assessments are
satisfied; for all i,
Qin(s
i∗) > Qin(t
i) (3.2)
and
ui(si∗, s−i∗) > Qin(t
i) (3.3)
for all ti 6= si∗. Note that condition (3.3) holds, since by condition (3.1), the minimum
value of the assessment of action ti is less than or equal to ui(ti, s−i∗), which is strictly
less than ui(si∗, s−i∗). Thus, players play the strict Nash equilibrium in period n. Note
also that
Qin+1(s
i∗) ≥ min{Qin(si∗), ui(si∗, s−i∗)} > Qin(ti) = Qin+1(ti)
for all ti 6= si∗ and players play the strict Nash equilibrium again in period n+1.
Proposition 7 says that any strict Nash equilibrium is always a candidate of the conver-
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gence point. However, it is possible that players end up playing a non-Nash equilibrium.
Hence, it is natural to consider the case where if they converge to play one action profile,
then it should be a strict Nash equilibrium. Notice that if one action profile (si)i∈I is
played forever, then (1) each player receives a better payoff than the assessment of chosen
action and he plays the action again, (2) each player receives a payoff which is not better
than the assessment of chosen action, but the assessments of the other actions are less
than the payoff, so that he plays the action again, or (3) the action gives the same payoff
for any other players’ actions, so that the assessment of the action is unchanged and the
assessments of other actions are strictly less than the assessment of the action1.
I say that players end up playing (si)i∈I if there exists n such that for all periods after
n, players play (si)i∈N . If the condition Qim(s
i) > Qim(t
i) satisfies for all i, m > n, and
si 6= ti, then players end up playing (si)i∈I 2. In the following statements, I focus on the
cases where all pure Nash equilibria are strict. I also assume that there do not exist any
redundant actions which always give the same constant payoff; for any i ∈ N and actions
si, ti ∈ Si, si 6= ti, the following condition does not hold;
ui(si, s−i) = ui(ti, t−i) for all s−i, t−i ∈ S−i.
Lemma 8. For any initial assessments, players never end up playing (si, s−i) if ∃i ∈ N ,
∃ti ∈ Si s.t.
ui(ti, t−i) 6= ui(ti, r−i) for some r−i 6= t−i ∈ S−i
1If players’ tie break rule satisfy the inertia condition, then the assessment of other actions need to
be weakly less than the assessment of this action and the action is played in the previous period.
2This condition does not include some convergence case which happens when I assume the inertia
condition to all players. In such a case, I can weaken the condition as follows; players converge to play
(si)i∈N if there exist n and (Qin)i∈I such that for all m ≥ n, i, and ti 6= si, Qim(si) ≥ Qim(ti) where player
i picks si in period n.
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and
ui(si, s−i) ≤ min
t−i∈S−i
ui(ti, t−i). (3.4)
Proof. I prove by contradiction; I assume that there exists a set of assessments such that
players end up playing (si)i∈I . Hence, there exists n such that for all m > n, Qm(si) >
Qm(t
i) > mint−i∈S−i ui(ti, t−i) for all ti ∈ Si 1. If ui(si, s−i) ≥ Qm(si), then ui(si, s−i) ≥
Qm(s
i) > Qm(t
i) > mint−i∈S−i ui(ti, t−i), which contradicts the hypothesis. If Qim(s
i) >
ui(si, s−i), then it should be that Qim(s
i) > ui(si, s−i) ≥ Qim(ti) > mint−i∈S−i u(ti, t−i), if
not, then Qim(s
i) becomes less than Qim(t
i). However, again the condition contradicts the
hypothesis.
If condition (3.4) is satisfied at non-Nash equilibrium action profiles, then players never
end up playing one of them. It is also obvious that the condition is not satisfied at each
strict Nash equilibrium. Condition (3.4) says that there exists at least one player who can
find an action which always gives a better payoff than his current payoff from the action. It
also means that there exists a player who receives a payoff which is less than his maximin
payoff. Though the condition limits the class of games, still there exist interesting games
which satisfy the condition. For example, the stag hunt game satisfies condition (3.4) at
non-Nash equilibrium action profiles and has the following payoff matrix;
Rabbit Stag
Rabbit 1,1 2,0
Stag 0,2 5,5
At non-Nash equilibrium action profile, one player decides to hunt a stag while the
other player decides to hunt a rabbit. The player who decides to hunt a stag fails and
1The following argument is also true if I assume that Qm(s
i) ≥ Qm(ti) for all m > n, which is the
condition for convergence when the inertia condition is assumed for each player’s tie break rule.
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receives nothing and the payoff is less than the minimum payoff from hunting a rabbit, 1,
which is given when both players decide to hunt a rabbit together and share it.
Another coordination game which satisfies condition (3.4) is the first order statistic
game where each player chooses a number from a finite set and coordination occurs when
all of them pick the same number. In addition, if players succeed to coordinate at a higher
number then they receive a better payoff. When they fail to coordinate on choosing the
same number, the player who has chosen the smallest number receives the best payoff,
the player who has chosen the second smallest number receives the second best payoff,
and so on; the smaller number the player has chosen, the better payoff he receives. For
example, I consider the case where each player picks a number from one to four and the
payoff matrix of each player is expressed as follows:
1 2 3 4
1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5
2 0 2 2.5 2.5
3 -1 0 3 3.5
4 -2 -1 0 4
The first column represents player i’s choice while the first row represents the minimum
value of his opponents’ choices. It is easy to see that at each Nash equilibrium, all players
pick the same number. Since action 1 gives at least 1 and players who fail to pick the
smallest number receives at most 0, this game satisfies the condition (3.4).
In both games, condition (3.4) holds strictly. In other games, such as the battle
of the sexes and pure coordination games, condition (3.4) holds weakly, in particular
ui(si, s−i) = ui(ti, t−i) for all i and (si), (ti) /∈ E∗, where E∗ is the set of pure Nash
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equilibria. For instance, the battle of the sexes game has the following payoff;
s21 s
2
2
s11 1,2 0,0
s12 0,0 2,1
In the following theorem, I show that players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost
surely if (i) condition (3.4) is satisfied strictly at non-Nash equilibrium profiles, or (ii) if
each player’s payoffs at non-Nash equilibrium action profiles are equal;
Theorem 3. Players end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium almost surely if (i) ∀(si)i∈N /∈
E∗, ∃i ∈ N , ∃ti ∈ Si s.t.
ui(si, s−i) < min
t−i∈S−i
ui(ti, t−i). (3.5)
or (ii) ui(si, s−i) = ui(ti, t−i) ∀i ∈ N and ∀(si)i∈N , (ti)i∈N /∈ E∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.4 VHBB Coordination Games
I first consider the coordination game proposed by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990),
where there exist M players with Si = S = {1, 2, ..., J} for all i ∈ N = {1, ...,M} and
players have the following payoff function;
ui(si, s−i) = a(min{s1, ..., sM})− bsi,
where a > b > 0 for all i ∈ N . If J=4, then player i’s payoffs are shown by the
following matrix;
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1 2 3 4
1 a-b a-b a-b a-b
2 a-2b 2a-2b 2a-2b 2a-2b
3 a-3b 2a-3b 3a-3b 3a-3b
4 a-4b 2a-4b 3a-4b 4a-4b
where the numbers in the first column correspond to player i’s action and the numbers
in the first row correspond to the minimum values of the opponents’ actions. It is easy to
check that (j, j, j, ...., j), j ∈ S, is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Notice that the pure Nash equilibria except (1, 1, ..., 1) are absorbing. However, if
I assume the inertia condition for each player’s tie break rule, then (1, 1, ..., 1) is also
absorbing. In this section, I assume that each player’s tie break rule satisfies the inertia
condition.
Lemma 9. For j ∈ S, the pure Nash equilibrium (j, j, ..., j) is absorbing.
When a player is choosing the smallest action among players’ actions, he is receiving
the best payoff that the action can give. Therefore, the player does not change his action
when he is choosing the smallest action except when he chooses 1 and is facing a tie
break situation. If the inertia condition is satisfied, then he chooses 1 forever and the
minimum value of actions does not increase over time. Moreover, since the minimum
value is bounded below, it converges.
Lemma 10. The minimum value of actions among players is non-increasing over periods
and converges almost surely.
I additionally assume that each action’s second best payoff, a(j−1)−bj for j ∈ S/{1},
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is less than the secure payoff, a− b. That is,
a(j − 1)− bj < a− b
for all j ∈ S/{1}. This means that each player receives a payoff better than the
secure payoff only when his choice is the smallest among all players’ choices. Given this
assumption, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 8. If a(j − 1) − bj < a − b for all j ∈ S\{1} and players’ tie break rules
satisfy the inertia condition, then players end up playing a pure Nash equilibrium almost
surely.
Proof. If a player is choosing an action which is not the smallest action among players,
then the payoff which the action gives is less than a− b. Let j(n) be the minimum value
of actions in period n. From Lemma 10, j(n) ≥ j(m) for m ≥ n. Hence, actions which are
strictly greater than j(n) always give a payoff less than a − b after period n. Therefore,
each player never plays s > j(n) infinitely often. If s > j(n) is played infinitely often,
then the assessment of the action becomes lower than a − b in some period m > n with
probability one; that is, the assessment of the action becomes lower than the assessment
of action 1. Since the assessment of the action 1 never changes, he never plays action s
afterwards, which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, after some period l > n, he plays j(n)
or some lower action. If all players play j = j(n), then players play (j, j, ..., j) afterwards.
If one player plays k < j(n) in period m > n and j(m) = k, then I can apply the same
logic. If j(n) = 1, then there is no lower number that players can choose and they end up
playing Nash equilibrium (1, 1, ..., 1). Since there are finitely many players and actions,
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players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost surely.
3.5 2×2 Coordination Games
In this section, I focus on 2×2 coordination games, which have the following payoff matrix;
s21 s
2
2
s11 a11, b11 a12, b12
s12 a21, b21 a22, b22
where a11 > a21, a22 > a12, b11 > b12 and b22 > b21 hold. Note that in these coordina-
tion games, the pure Nash equilibria are (s11, s
2
1) and (s
1
2, s
2
2). For the purpose of analysis,
I divide 2×2 coordination games into three categories according to the number of action
profiles at each of which each player receives a payoff which is strictly better than another
payoff that his current action gives; if (s1i , s
2
j) is such an action profile, then aij > aik and
bij > blj for j 6= k and i 6= l. Note that such action profile is absorbing. Therefore, the
categorization also depends on the number of absorbing states under the tie break rule
with the uniform condition. It is easy to check that there exist three possible cases for
general 2×2 games: (1) both diagonal or both off-diagonal action profiles are absorbing
states; (2) only one action profile is an absorbing state; or (3) there does not exist any
absorbing state.
Since 2×2 coordination games have additional conditions, off-diagonal action profiles
cannot be absorbing at the same time. Therefore, the condition for (1) is as follows;
(1) min{a11, a22} > max{a21, a12} and min{b11, b22} > max{b12, b21}.
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In the case of (2) and (3), the following condition should hold:
(2), (3) min{a11, a22} ≤ max{a21, a12} or min{b11, b22} ≤ max{b12, b21}.
Without loss of generality, I assume for case (2) and (3) that a22 ≤ a21, that is, a11 >
a21 ≥ a22 > a12 holds. Note that if an absorbing state exists, then it should be (s11, s21) or
(s12, s
2
1). Given the inequality of payoffs for player 1, (2-1) if b11 > b21 holds, then (s
1
1, s
2
1)
is the unique absorbing state; (2-2) if b21 > b11 and a21 > a22 hold, then (s
1
2, s
2
1) is the
unique absorbing state; (3) if otherwise, then there does not exist an absorbing state.
In the following sections, I investigate games in categories (1), (2-1), (2-2) and (3).
Specifically, the following games are considered: the battle of the sexes game and pure
coordination games from category (1), the stag hunt game from category (2-1) and market
entry games and the game of chicken from category (2-2) and (3).
3.5.1 The Battle of the Sexes Game and Pure Coordination
Games
In this subsection I consider coordination games in category (1). Games in this cate-
gory satisfy the following conditions; min{a11, a22} > max{a21, a12} and min{b11, b22} >
max{b12, b21} and on-diagonal action profiles, pure Nash equilibria, are absorbing states.
The condition says that for both players, coordinating one of the Nash equilibria always
gives a better payoff than playing non-Nash equilibrium profiles. It is easy to see that the
battle of the sexes game and pure coordination games satisfy the condition. For instance,
the battle of the sexes game has the following payoff matrix;
In this game, the row player prefers going to a football game together to going to an
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Opera Football
Opera 1, 2 0, 0
Football 0, 0 2, 1
opera together, while the column player enjoys going to the opera together more than
going to a football game together. However, players are worse off when they fail to
coordinate to go to one of them.
By Theorem 3, we know that players end up playing a pure Nash equilibrium almost
surely;
Corollary 4. In 2×2 coordination games in category (1), if u1(s1k, s2l ) ≥ u1(s1l , s2k) and
u2(s1l , s
2
k) ≥ u2(s1k, s2l ) for k 6= l, then players end up playing a pure Nash equilibrium.
Another case to be considered is that each player receives the worst payoff from the
same action profile. Assume that players have the following payoff matrix;
Opera Football
Opera 1,2 0,0
Football 0.5,0.5 2,1
Notice that the row player enjoys going to a football game alone more than going to an
opera alone. The column player is in the opposite situation - she enjoys going to the opera
alone more than going to the football game alone. In this case, it is a possible outcome
that players fail to coordinate and they end up playing their favored actions (Football,
Opera).
Proposition 9. In 2×2 coordination games in category (1), if u1(s1k, s2l ) > u1(s1l , s2k) and
u2(s1k, s
2
l ) > u
2(s1l , s
2
k) for k 6= l, then players end up playing a Nash equilibrium or (s1k, s2l ).
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Proof. Since (s1l , s
2
k) gives the worst payoff for both players, they never play (s
1
l , s
2
k) in-
finitely often. Notice, too, that if Q1(s1l ) < akl and Q
2(s2k) < bkl, then player 1 never
plays s1l and player 2 never plays s
2
k; they end up playing (s
1
k, s
2
l ). In sum, players end up
playing a Nash equilibrium or (s1k, s
2
l ).
3.5.2 The Stag Hunt Game
In this subsection, I consider coordination games in category (2-1), where the conditions
a11 > a21 ≥ a22 > a12 and b11 > b21 hold. For example, the stag hunt game satisfies this
condition; the condition b11 > b12 ≥ b22 > b21 holds in the stag hunt game. For instance,
the stag hunt game has the following payoff matrix;
s21 s
2
2
s11 10,10 0,8
s12 8,0 7,7
It is worth noting that in the stag hunt game, Nash equilibrium (s12, s
2
2) is not absorb-
ing. However, players end up playing one of pure Nash equilibria, including (s12, s
2
2). In
the stag hunt game, at each off-diagonal action profile, one player receives the worst pay-
off. Therefore, by Theorem 3, players end up playing a Nash equilibrium almost surely.
In category (2-1), a slightly weaker condition on off-diagonal payoffs is required for the
convergence to Nash equilibrium;
Proposition 10. In 2×2 coordination games in category (2-1), players end up playing a
pure Nash equilibrium almost surely if b12 ≥ b21.
Proof. Note that if players play (s11, s
2
1) once, they play it forever. Now I show that players
never stick to (s11, s
2
2) or (s
1
2, s
2
1). If players play (s
1
1, s
2
2) infinitely often, then whenever they
61
play it, there is a positive probability that the assessment of s11 becomes lower than a22 and
then player 1 stops playing s11. Next I assume that b12 > b21. By the same logic, players
cannot play (s12, s
2
1) infinitely often, since player 2 stops playing s
2
1 in some period in which
Q2(s21) < b12. Last, I assume that b12 = b21. I assume that players never play (s
1
1, s
2
1).
Therefore, players play only (s11, s
2
2), (s
1
2, s
2
1) or (s
1
2, s
2
2). Note that when players (s
1
2, s
2
1),
player 2 is receiving the worst payoff, while player 1 is receiving the best payoff from s12.
Therefore, player 2 changes his action to s22 at some point. Note also that if Q
1(s11) > a22,
then players change to play (s11, s
2
2) at some point, since player 1 is receiving the worst
payoff from s12. At (s
1
1, s
2
2), both players receive the worst payoff so players change and play
(1) (s12, s
2
1) or (2) (s
1
2, s
2
2). Hence, players infinitely play (s
1
1, s
2
2). If so, then at some period,
the assessment of action s11 becomes lower than a22. Therefore, player 1 stops playing s
1
1.
Given this fact, players end up by playing (s12, s
2
2) almost surely. This is because (1) at
(s12, s
2
1) player 2 receives the worst payoff and he changes to s
2
2, (2) at (s
1
2, s
2
2), player 1
receives the worst payoff from action s12, though the assessment of s
1
1 is lower than a22;
player 1 never changes his action to s11.
If b12 < b21 is satisfied, then there exists a possibility that players play (s
1
2, s
2
1) forever.
This happens when Q2(s22) < b21 and Q
1(s11) < a22.
3.5.3 The Game of Chicken and Market Entry Games
In this subsection, I first consider coordination games in category (2-2), where b21 > b11
and a21 > a22 hold. Since (s
1
2, s
2
1) is absorbing, the convergence to Nash equilibrium is
not guaranteed in games in this category. For example, the game of chicken satisfies the
condition, where it has the following payoff matrix:
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Swerve Stay
Stay 1, -1 -10, -10
Swerve 0, 0 -1, 1
where each player shows his cowardice to the audiences when he swerves while his
opponent stays. If both players swerve, then both of them are safe and receive nothing.
However, the best outcome for each player is that he stays while the opponent swerves,
so that he can gain reputation. The worst scenario is that both players stay and have a
severe accident.
Note that when they play (Swerve, Swerve), the assessment for the action ”Swerve”
for both players does not deteriorate and they continue to play (Swerve, Swerve). Notice
that they never end up at (Stay, Stay). If so, then one player’s assessment of action
“Stay” becomes lower than -1 at some point and the player stops playing the action.
In addition, when players play action profiles except (Swerve, Swerve), there exists a
positive probability that the assessment of “Stay” becomes lower than -1. If so, the player
stops playing “Stay” and they end up playing a Nash equilibrium or (Swerve, Swerve).
For this type of game, we have the following result:
Proposition 11. In coordination games in category (2-2), players end up playing a Nash
equilibrium or (s12, s
2
1) almost surely.
Proof. First of all, players cannot end up playing (s11, s
2
2). If it does, one player’s as-
sessment of the action becomes lower than the minimum payoff of the other action and
he stops playing the action. Notice also that (s12, s
2
1) is absorbing and players end up
playing (s12, s
2
1) once players play it. In addition, for each pure Nash equilibrium, there
exists an assessment for each player and each action such that players end up playing the
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Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the other case to be considered is that players play Nash
equilibria and (s11, s
2
2) infinitely often without converging to either of them. However, this
happens with probability zero. It is easy to show that (s11, s
2
2) is played infinitely often in
this case. The reason is that the player who is receiving the best payoff at a Nash equilib-
rium does not change his action while the other player receives the worst payoff from the
action and changes his action. Thus players change to play from one Nash equilibrium to
another action profile, (s11, s
2
2). When (s
1
1, s
2
2) is played, with the positive probability that
is bounded below, one player’s assessment of the action becomes lower than the minimum
payoff of the other action and he stops playing the action. In this case, players end up
playing a Nash equilibrium or (s12, s
2
1). Since (s
1
1, s
2
2) is played infinitely often, players end
up playing a Nash equilibrium or (s12, s
2
1) almost surely.
Now consider a market entry game which has the following payoff matrix;
Stay Out Enter
Enter 100,0 -50,-50
Stay Out 0,0 0,100
where the action “Stay Out” always gives 0. Notice that this game satisfies the
condition b21 = b11 and a21 = a22 and there does not exist any absorbing state. In this
case, players end up playing (Enter, Stay Out), (Stay Out, Enter) or (Stay Out, Stay
Out). For instance, once player 1’s assessment of “Enter” becomes lower than 0, he does
not play “Enter” any more. Then, players end up playing (Stay Out, Enter) if player 2’s
assessment of “Enter” is greater or equal to 0 and players end up playing (Stay Out, Stay
Out) otherwise. Since (Enter, Enter) gives the worst payoff to both players, at some point,
at least one player’s assessment of “Enter” becomes lower than 0. Therefore, players end
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up playing one of the action profiles, except for (Enter, Enter).
3.6 Non-Random Weighting Parameters
In this section, I assume that players’ weighting parameters are not random variables. For
example, players may believe that all past experiences equally represent the corresponding
action’s value, that is, players believe that the environments in which they are involved are
stationary. Therefore, in each period, players put the same weight on all past experiences
and players’ assessments become arithmetic mean of past payoffs. Note that the weighting
parameters for each player are as follows; λin(s
i
j) =
1
τ(n)+1
for all i ∈ N and sij ∈ Si where
τ(n) is the number of times that the action sij is played until period n.
I also consider the players who have the following weighting parameters; λin(s
i
j) = λ for
all i, sij and n as in Sarin and Vahid (2001); all players have constant weighting parameters
in all periods, that is, both players always put the same weight on the received payoff in
each period. It is reasonable to assume this condition if players believe that the situation
they are facing is non-stationary. If λ is close to 1, then players believe that only the most
recent payoffs give information about the values of corresponding actions. If λ is close
to 0, then players believe that initial assessments of actions mostly represent the actions’
value.
In this section, I consider the battle of the sexes game, in which players may play off-
diagonal action profiles alternately without ending up at a Nash equilibrium. In detail, I
first consider the case where λin(s
i
j) =
1
τ(n)+1
for all i, sij and n and off-diagonal payoffs
for each player are all equivalent; a12 = a21, b12 = b21. In particular, I assume that a12 = 0
and b12 = 0.
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As an example, consider the case where players’ initial assessments are as follows:
Q11(s
1
1) = 0.2, Q
1
1(s
1
2) = 0.2 + , Q
2
1(s
2
1) = 0.2 + , Q
2
1(s
2
2) = 0.2, where  ∈ (0, 0.2) is an
irrational number. In this case, in the first period, they play (s12, s
2
1) and both players
receive payoff 0. In period 2, players’ assessments are as follows: Q12(s
1
1) = 0.2, Q
1
2(s
1
2) =
1
2
(0.2 + ), Q22(s
2
1) =
1
2
(0.2 + ), Q22(s
2
2) = 0.2. Notice that the assessments of s
1
1 and s
2
2 are
greater than the assessments of s12 and s
2
1. Hence, players play (s
1
1, s
2
2) and both players
receive payoff 0. Using the payoff information in period 2, they update their assessments
and they have the following assessments in period 3: Q13(s
1
1) =
1
2
(0.2), Q13(s
1
2) =
1
2
(0.2+),
Q23(s
2
1) =
1
2
(0.2 + ), Q23(s
2
2) =
1
2
(0.2). Then players play (s12, s
2
1) in period 3. Notice that
their assessments of action s11 and s
2
2 never coincide with the assessments of action s
1
2 and
s21 at any period because of . After period 3, players play (s
1
2, s
2
1) until the corresponding
assessments become lower than the assessments of (s11, s
2
2). After the event, players again
switch back to play (s11, s
2
2), and so on.
When λin(s
i
j) =
1
τ(n)+1
for all i, sij and n, the following statement shows the condition
of initial assessments for coordination failures, which is the play on off-diagonal action
profiles alternately. In this section, I assume that players’ tie break rules satisfy the inertia
condition.
Proposition 12. In 2 × 2 coordination games with a12 = a21 = b12 = b21 = 0, under the
inertia condition, if λin(s
i
j) =
1
τ(n)+1
for all i, sij and n, then the necessary and sufficient
condition for the coordination failure is as follows:
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
=
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
Proof. See Appendix.
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This result says that players will play non-Nash equilibria alternately forever if and
only if players’ ratios of initial assessments “coordinate”.
Next, I consider the players who have the following weighting parameters; λin(s
i
j) = λ
for all i, sij and n. Then the necessary and sufficient condition of initial assessments for
the coordination failure is as follows:
Proposition 13. In 2 × 2 coordination games with a12 = a21 = b12 = b21 = 0, under
the inertia condition, if λin(s
i
j) = λ for all i, s
i
j and n, then the necessary and sufficient
condition for the coordination failure is as follows; for some z ∈ Z,
(1− λ)z−1 > Q
1
1(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
≥ (1− λ)z and (1− λ)z−1 > Q
2
1(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
≥ (1− λ)z
or
(1− λ)z−1 ≥ Q
1
1(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
> (1− λ)z and (1− λ)z−1 ≥ Q
2
1(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
> (1− λ)z
Proof. See Appendix.
Since players play a Nash equilibrium forever if they coordinate once on the Nash
equilibrium, for each case, the negation of the condition is the one for the success of
coordination. For instance, if off-diagonal payoffs are all zero and players are frequentists,
then they coordinate in some period and in all subsequent periods if and only if the
initial assessments for both players and actions should satisfy the following condition:
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
6= Q21(s21)
Q21(s
2
2)
.
3.6.1 Coordinated Play on the Off-Diagonal Action Profiles
67
It is an interesting question whether the empirical frequency of play on the off-diagonal
action profiles converges to the mixed Nash equilibrium. In fictitious play, Monderer and
Shapley (1996) show that every 2×2 game with the diagonal property1 has the fictitious
play property; the empirical frequency of past play, which is a belief of players about an
opponent player’s behaviour, converges to a Nash equilibrium.
First note that 2 × 2 coordination games with a21 = a12 = b12 = b21 = 0 also have
the diagonal property. In the case, under the condition of coordination failure, players
forever play off-diagonal action profiles alternately. However, the frequency of the play
need not converge to the mixed Nash equilibrium. I show this by an example. Consider
the battle of the sexes game which has the following payoff matrix;
s21 s
2
2
s11 1,2 0,0
s12 0,0 2,1
I assume that weighting parameters and initial assessments for players are as follows:
λ1n(s
1
1) = λ
2
n(s
2
2) =
1
2
, λ1n(s
1
2) = λ
2
n(s
2
1) =
1
4
, Q11(s
1
1) = Q
2
1(s
2
2) =
1
2
, Q11(s
1
2) = Q
2
1(s
2
1) =
1
4
.
Under the inertia condition for both players, it is easy to see that players play action
profiles in the following order; (s11, s
2
2) → (s11, s22) → (s12, s21) → (s11, s22) → (s11, s22) →
(s12, s
2
1) → .... In period 1, they play (s11, s22) and the assessments of s11 and s22 become 14 .
Because of the inertia condition, they choose (s11, s
2
2) again in period 2 and their assess-
ments become 1
8
. Now players change to play (s12, s
2
1) in period 3 and the assessments of
1The game has the diagonal property if α 6= 0 and β 6= 0, where
α = a11 + a22 − a12 − a21
and
β = b11 + b22 − b12 − b21.
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s12 and s
2
1 become
1
16
. In period 4, players return to play (s11, s
2
2) and so on. Therefore, the
empirical frequencies of play for both players converge to ((2
3
, 1
3
), (1
3
, 2
3
)), while the mixed
Nash equilibrium in this game is ((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
)).
3.7 Discussion
This model can be also interpreted as a population model. Consider the situation in which
there exist two large populations of naive players. In each period one player is picked from
each population randomly and plays a 2×2 coordination game, but he can play the game
only once1. After each player plays the game, he reports the payoff which he has received
to each population. I assume that each population does not share information with
the other population. Each population accumulates information as a public assessment,
which consists of realized payoffs and the initial assessment. In each period, the public
assessment of the action which is played is updated, using realized payoffs as defined
above; the convex combination of the realized payoff and the public assessment in the
previous period. Each player may not know whether he is playing a game, but he knows
the public assessment. Using the public assessment, each player chooses an action which
has the highest public assessment.
For example consider the battle of the sexes game. After the result of going to the
opera or the football, both players report the realized payoff to the population which they
belong to so that people in the population can make an assessment before they play the
game themselves. The result above says that players from two different populations never
coordinate when initial assessments satisfy the condition in Proposition 12 when they are
1Or each population is so large that the probability that a player plays a game again is almost 0.
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frequentists. Otherwise, players coordinate to play one of the pure Nash equilibria.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Theorem 3
It is a direct consequence from Lemma 8 that if players end up playing one action profile,
then it should be a strict Nash equilibrium. Therefore, it should be shown that they
actually end up playing a strict Nash equilibrium. The intuition of the proof is as follows.
Since off-diagonal action profiles cannot be played infinitely often, there exists a period
after which players only play Nash equilibria. Since I consider games with strict Nash
equilibrium, players should change their actions at the same time when they move from
one Nash equilibrium to another Nash equilibrium. Note also that weighting parameters
are assumed to be independent, so that perfect correlated play on Nash equilibria is
impossible. Now, the detailed proofs are given in the following arguments.
(i) At any non-Nash equilibrium action profile, there exists a positive probability
such that one player who is receiving a worse payoff stops playing the action and plays
another action. Note that at the non-Nash equilibrium action profile, (si)i, the player
who is suffering the worse payoff never plays his current action at least with the following
probability:
Pr(Qin(s
i) ∈ (ui(si, s−i), min
t−i∈S−i
ui(ti, t−i)) | A),
where A := {Qin−1(si) > Qin−1(ti) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti 6= si} and this probability is bounded below
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by the following probability:
Pr(Qin(s
i) ∈ (ui(si, s−i), min
t−i∈S−i
ui(ti, t−i))) | A,B),
where B = {Qin−1(si) = maxs−i ui(si, s−i)}. Since the sets of players and actions are finite,
if players play a non-Nash equilibrium action profile infinitely often, then the player who
receives a worse payoff stops playing the action with probability one. Therefore, players
do not play a non-Nash equilibrium action profile infinitely often. Hence, I assume that
players only play some Nash equilibrium action profiles. The cases to be considered
are that players play some Nash equilibria alternately without converging one of them.
Since the game which I consider here has only strict Nash equilibria, all players should
change their strategies at the same time when they change from one Nash equilibrium
to another. Let (si∗)i∈N and (si∗∗)i∈N be two different strict Nash equilibrium action
profiles which are played infinitely often. In this argument, I assume that players play
only those two strict Nash equilibria alternately. The argument can be extended easily
to the case where players play more than two Nash equilibria. Note that since players
change one strict Nash equilibrium action profile to another strict Nash equilibrium action
profile at the same time, all players should receive the payoffs which are strictly less than
their current assessments. It should be true that ui(si∗, s−i∗) = ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) for all i
and each player i’s assessment never reaches the level ui(si∗, s−i∗) in a finite period. In
the following argument, I show that players fail to play strict Nash equilibria alternately
with probability one; to show that, I consider the periods in which players change from
(si∗∗)i∈N to (si∗)i∈N .
By the assumption on weighting parameters, we can ignore the case where Qi(si∗) =
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Qi(si∗∗). Note also that we have the following results. Consider period n such that the
condition Qin−1(s
i∗) > Qin−1(s
i∗∗) > Qin(s
i∗) holds. Then for any small ε ∈ (0, 1), there
exist 0 < ci, di < 1 such that
Pr(Qin(s
i∗) ∈ (εui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + (1− ε)Qin−1(si∗∗), Qin−1(si,∗∗)) | C) ≤ ci
and
Pr(Qin(s
i∗) ∈ (ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗), (1− ε)ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + εQin−1(si∗∗)) | C) ≤ di,
where C := {Qin−1(si∗) > Qin−1(si∗∗) > Qin(si∗)}. Note that
Pr(Qin(s
i∗) ∈ (εui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + (1− ε)Qin−1(si∗∗), Qin−1(si∗∗)) | C)
=
Pr(εui∗∗ + (1− ε)Qi∗∗n−1 < λui∗∗ + (1− λ)Qi∗n−1 < Qi∗∗n−1)
Pr(λui∗∗ + (1− λ)Qi∗n−1 < Qi∗∗n−1)
=
F (K)− F ((1− ε)K)
F (K)
= 1− F ((1− ε)K)
F (K)
and
Pr(Qin(s
i∗) ∈ (ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗), (1− ε)ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + εQin−1(si∗∗)) | C)
=
Pr(ui∗∗ < λui∗∗ + (1− λ)Qi∗n−1 < (1− ε)ui∗∗ + εQi∗∗n−1)
Pr(λui∗∗ + (1− λ)Qi∗n−1 < Qi∗∗n−1)
=
F (εK)
F (K)
,
where ui∗∗ = ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗), λ = λin(s
i∗∗), Qi∗n−1 = Q
i
n−1(s
i∗), Qi∗∗n−1 = Q
i
n−1(s
i∗∗), F (x) =
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Pr((1 − λ) ≤ x) for x ∈ (0, 1) and K = Qi∗∗n−1−ui∗∗
Qi∗n−1−ui∗∗
. Notice that for any K ∈ (0, 1],
F (cK)
F (K)
∈ (0, 1) and limK→0 F (cK)F (K) = limK→0 cf(cK)f(K) = c where c ∈ {ε, 1− ε}, f is the density
function for the weighting parameter and f(0) <∞.
Therefore for player i, with probability one, there exist infinitely many periods n such
that
Qin(s
i∗) < εui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + (1− ε)Qin−1(si∗∗).
and
Qin(s
i∗) > (1− ε)ui(si∗∗, s−i∗∗) + εQin−1(si∗∗).
I focus on the cases where both conditions hold when player i changes his action from si∗
to si∗∗.
Now I consider period n in which players are playing (si∗∗)i∈N . For the case
Qjn+1(s
j∗) ∈ [εuj(sj∗∗, s−j∗∗) + (1− ε)Qjn(sj∗∗), Qjn(sj∗∗))
for j 6= i, we have
Pr(Qin+1(s
i∗∗) ≥ Qin(si∗))× Pr(Qjn+1(sj∗∗) < Qjn(sj∗)) ≥ e1,ij,
and for the case
Qjn(s
j∗) < εuj(sj∗∗, s−j∗∗) + (1− ε)Qjn(sj∗∗)
for j 6= i, we have
Pr(Qin+1(s
i∗∗) < Qin(s
i∗))× Pr(Qjn+1(sj∗∗) ≥ Qjn(sj∗)) ≥ e2,ij
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for some e1ij > 0 and e2,ij > 0. In any cases, the probability that players fail to play
the same strict Nash equilibrium in period n + 1 has positive probability which has the
lower bound minh∈{1,2}minij,i6=j{eh,ij} > 0. Since players change from (si∗∗)i∈N to (si∗)i∈N
infinitely many times, players fail to play strict Nash equilibrium with probability one,
which contradicts the hypothesis. Therefore, the only possibility is that players play only
one Nash equilibrium after some period.
(ii) Note that if the condition in (ii) satisfies, then the payoff from any Nash equilibrium
should be greater than the payoff from non-Nash equilibrium; ui(si∗, s−i∗) > ui(si, s−i) for
all i ∈ N, (si∗) ∈ E∗, and (si) /∈ E∗. Therefore, each pure Nash equilibrium is absorbing
and players who play a Nash equilibrium once play it forever. By the same logic as the
proof in (i), players cannot play only non-Nash equilibrium action profiles forever. That
is, with probability one, players play a Nash equilibrium at some time and then play it in
all subsequent periods.
3.8.2 Proof of Proposition 12
I assume that each player’s initial assessments of both actions are different. Then the
condition of coordination failure under the inertia condition for each player’s tie break
rule is as follows; for j 6= k and (1) for the initial assessment, Qi1(sij) > Qi1(sik) and
Q−i1 (s
−i
k ) > Q
−i
1 (s
−i
j ) and (2) for any n, Q
i
n(s
i
j) ≥ Qin(sik) and Q−in (s−ik ) ≥ Q−in (s−ij ), where
if one of the inequalities holds, then (i) Qin−1(s
i
j) > Q
i
n−1(s
i
k) and Q
−i
n−1(s
−i
k ) > Q
−i
n−1(s
−i
j )
and (ii) Qin+1(s
i
j) < Q
i
n+1(s
i
k) and Q
−i
n+1(s
−i
k ) < Q
−i
n+1(s
−i
j ). Let Qˆ
i
t(s
i
j) be the assessment
of action sij when only (s
i
j, s
−i
k ) is played t times where j 6= k. Then it can be easily
verified that the condition for coordination failure is equivalent to the following condition;
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for any u, t ∈ N, Qˆiu(sij) ≥ Qˆit(sik) and Qˆ−iu (s−ik ) ≥ Qˆ−it (s−ij ) where if one of inequalities
holds, then Qˆiu−1(s
i
j) > Qˆ
i
t(s
i
k) and Qˆ
−i
u−1(s
−i
k ) > Qˆ
−i
t (s
−i
j ) and Qˆ
i
u+1(s
i
j) < Qˆ
i
t(s
i
k) and
Qˆ−iu+1(s
−i
k ) < Qˆ
−i
t (s
−i
j ) for j 6= k. Therefore, in the following proofs, I use the latter
condition.
The important factor of this argument is that the players change actions at the same
time and they ’coordinate’ at coordination failure. If the players coordinate on diago-
nal action profiles once, then they succeed in coordinating. Therefore if the following
conditions are satisfied, players never coordinate; for any m and n ∈ N,
1
n
Q11(s
1
j) ≥
1
m
Q11(s
1
k) and
1
n
Q21(s
2
k) ≥
1
m
Q21(s
2
j)
holds, where equalities among them do not hold consecutively; if one of the equalities
holds at m, n then both inequalities hold strictly at m, n−1 and m, n+1. In the following
argument, I show that this condition is equivalent to the following condition:
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
=
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
To make this clear, I assume first that if one of inequalities holds with equality, then both
inequalities should hold with equality. Then the original condition above can be expressed
as follows:
Q11(s
1
2) <
m
n
Q11(s
1
1) and Q
2
1(s
2
2) >
n
m
Q21(s
2
1)
or
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Q11(s
1
2) >
m
n
Q11(s
1
1) and Q
2
1(s
2
2) <
n
m
Q21(s
2
1)
or
Q11(s
1
2) =
m
n
Q11(s
1
1) and Q
2
1(s
2
2) =
n
m
Q21(s
2
1).
Note that if
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
is a rational number, then there exist m and n such that
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
= m
n
.
By the last condition, we should have
Q21(s
2
2)
Q21(s
2
1)
= n
m
, that is,
Q21(s
2
2)
Q21(s
2
1)
should be a rational
number too. If
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
is an irrational number, then
Q21(s
2
2)
Q21(s
2
1)
should be also an irrational
number. If
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
6= Q21(s21)
Q21(s
2
2)
, say if
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
>
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
, then there exists a rational number m
n
such that
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
> m
n
>
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
. This means that Q11(s
1
2) >
m
n
Q11(s
1
1) and Q
2
1(s
2
2) >
n
m
Q21(s
2
1)
and it contradicts the conditions above. Hence the following relation
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
=
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
is the
only case which satisfies the condition above.
Now consider the other cases. There exist m and n ∈ N such that 1
n
Qi1(s
i
1) =
1
m
Qi1(s
i
2)
and 1
n
Qj1(s
j
2) 6= 1mQj1(sj1), say 1nQj1(sj2) > 1mQj1(sj1),1. Then
1
n− 1Q
i
1(s
i
1) >
1
m
Qi1(s
i
2) and
1
n− 1Q
j
1(s
j
2) >
1
m
Qj1(s
j
1)
and
1
n+ 1
Qi1(s
i
1) <
1
m
Qi1(s
i
2) and
1
n+ 1
Qj1(s
j
2) <
1
m
Qj1(s
j
1)
1If 1nQ
j
1(s
j
2) <
1
mQ
j
1(s
j
1), then
1
n
Qi1(s
i
1) <
1
m− 1Q
i
1(s
i
2) and
1
n
Qj1(s
j
2) <
1
m− 1Q
j
1(s
j
1)
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should hold. Notice that
Qi1(s
i
1)
Qi1(s
i
2)
should be a rational number n
m
. Moreover, by the
conditions above, we have n+1
m
>
Qj1(s
j
2)
Qj1(s
j
1)
> n
m
. It is easy to see that at 2n and 2m, the
following conditions also satisfy; 1
2n
Qi1(s
i
1) =
1
2m
Qi1(s
i
2) and
1
2n
Qj1(s
j
2) >
1
2m
Qj1(s
j
1). Thus
we have the following condition: 2n+1
2m
>
Qj1(s
j
2)
Qj1(s
j
1)
> 2n
2m
. Using the same logic, the condition
should be satisfied for any kn and km where k ∈ N. If k →∞, then the condition becomes
as follows; n
m
≥ Qj1(sj2)
Qj1(s
j
1)
> n
m
. However, there do not exist initial assessments which satisfy
this condition1. Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for initial assessments
for the coordination failure in this case is equivalent to the following condition:
Q11(s
1
2)
Q11(s
1
1)
=
Q21(s
2
1)
Q21(s
2
2)
.
3.8.3 Proof of Proposition 13
It can be shown that the following condition is equivalent to the condition for the coor-
dination failure in the coordination game; for any t, there exists u such that
Qˆit(s
i
1) ∈ (Qˆiu+1(si2), Qˆiu(si2)] and Qˆ−it (s−i2 ) ∈ (Qˆ−iu+1(s−i1 ), Qˆ−iu (s−i1 )]
or
Qˆit(s
i
1) ∈ [Qˆiu+1(si2), Qˆiu(si2)) and Qˆit(s−i2 ) ∈ [Qˆ−iu+1(s−i1 ), Qˆ−iu (s−i1 ))
for all i2. Since Qˆit(s
i
j) = (1− λ)tQˆi0(sij), the condition in Proposition 13 can be easily
1If 1nQ
j
1(s
j
2) <
1
mQ
j
1(s
j
1) then it satisfies that
n+1
m <
Qj1(s
j
2)
Qj1(s
j
1)
< nm . By the same argument, There exist
no initial assessments which satisfy the conditions.
2For example, if Qˆim(s
i
1) > Qˆ
i
0(s
i
2), then I assume that Qˆ
i
−1(s
i
2) is the maximum payoff which both
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derived.
actions give so that Qˆim(s
i
1) ∈ (Qˆi0(si2), Qˆi−1(si2)]. In addition, let Qˆi∞(si2) be the minimum payoff which
both actions give and Qˆi∞+1(s
i
2) be the minimum payoff of those which both actions give. Then if
Qˆim(s
i
1) ≤ Qˆi∞(si2), Qˆim(si1) ∈ (Qˆi∞+1(si2), Qˆi∞(si2)].
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CHAPTER 4
ADAPTIVE LEARNING MODELS IN FINITELY
REPEATED GAMES
4.1 Introduction
Many theoretical researchers have analyzed adaptive learning models in normal form
games. In the literature, they investigate the behaviour of adaptive players who learn the
opponents’ behaviour or the values of their own actions over repeated plays of the game.
One of their main interests is whether their behaviour in the long run corresponds to
Nash equilibrium or perturbed Nash equilibrium, which is Nash equilibrium under pay-
off perturbations. Meanwhile, adaptive learning in extensive form games without payoff
perturbations is also of interest among theoretical researchers, who focus on equilibrium
concepts such as sequential equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium and self-confirming
equilibrium, which is introduced by Fudenberg and Kreps (1995)1. While an equilibrium
concept in extensive form games with payoff perturbations, agent quantal response equi-
librium, is introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), to my best knowledge, there is no
1The self-confirming equilibrium may not be Nash equilibrium, since it does not require the correct
belief about behavioural strategies of other players at relevant information sets at off the equilibrium
path. In detail, see Fudenberg and Kreps (1995)
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literature which investigates adaptive learning that leads to the equilibrium. Therefore,
it is intriguing to investigate which type of adaptive learning leads to the equilibrium.
It is not only among theoretical researchers’ interests but also experimental researchers
to investigate learning in extensive form games. For example, the centipede game (McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1992, Palacious-Huerta and Volij, 2009) and the finitely repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma (Selten and Stoecker, 1986) are such examples. In the experimental liter-
ature, we observe that players learn from their past plays and adjust their behaviour. In
addition, the experiments show deviations from the equilibrium predictions. It is also of
interest to investigate which type of adaptive learning leads to such consequences.
In this chapter, I investigate the learning process of adaptive players who face a fixed
extensive form game, in particular a finitely repeated game in each of infinitely many
periods. In particular, I consider the case in which the players have limited information
about their decision-making environment; they know their available actions in each period
and observe realized payoffs but they may not know their own and opponents’ payoff
functions. Therefore, we need a model which does not require players to have knowledge
about the payoff functions; I consider the case in which each player assigns his subjective
assessments on his actions based on his past experience and picks the action which he
thinks is the best. Using realized payoff information, each player updates the assessments
of chosen actions adaptively; I consider players who follow the Q-learning updating rule
and Sarin and Vahid (1999) updating rule.
I first assume that players experience random shocks on their assessments. If each
stage game of the finitely repeated game consists of an extensive form game with perfect
information, then I show that their behavioural strategies converge to the agent quantal
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response equilibrium (AQRE hereafter,) introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998).
When a normal form game is played in each stage game, I provide an additional condition
which guarantees convergence to the unique AQRE of the supergame. Next, I assume that
players do not experience random shocks on their assessments. Then I show that (1) when
they face the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, both players may end up cooperating
at each stage game; and (2) when they play some finitely repeated coordination games,
both players end up coordinating in each stage game.
The adaptive learning models considered here are introduced by Watkins and Dayan
(1992) and Sarin and Vahid (1999). The models are developed to analyze decision prob-
lems, some authors have applied the models to investigate normal form games (Sarin,
1999, Leslie and Collins, 2005 and Cominetti et al., 2010) and extensive form games of
perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (Jehiel and Samet, 2005).
In particular, Jehiel and Samet (2005) show that players’ strategies, where they follow a
specific Sarin and Vahid (1999) updating rule, approach the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium. Note that in this chapter, I show a similar result, but the underlying games are
allowed to have multiple subgame perfect equilibria. Another learning model in games,
reinforcement learning model, is introduced by Erev and Roth (1998) and when an ex-
tensive form game of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is
played by the players, convergence to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is shown
by Laslier and Walliser (2005). Lastly, in a learning model which requires players to have
knowledge about the structures of the game, such as fictitious play model, convergence
of beliefs to a unique sequential equilibrium is investigated by Hendon et al. (1993) and
Groes et al. (1999).
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, the notation for general
extensive form games is introduced. In Section 4.3 the equilibrium concept under payoff
perturbation, agent quantal response equilibrium, and its properties are provided. In
Section 4.4, the learning rule and the decision rule of adaptive players are introduced.
The results of the learning process are also shown in the chapter. In Section 4.5, the
case without noise is analyzed, and Section 4.7 concludes. All proofs are placed in the
Appendix.
4.2 Extensive Form Games
I first consider an extensive form game1 Γ, which consists of the set of players N , histories
H, player function P , and information sets I. The set of players consists of M players;
N = {1, 2, ...,M}. A history h ∈ H is a sequence of actions taken by players; h =
(a1, ..., aK), ak ∈ A for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is a history with the length of K, where A is the set
of actions for all players,. The set of histories H includes the empty set ∅ =: h0, which
corresponds to the initial node. A history h = (a1, ..., aK) is terminal if there does not
exist aK+1 ∈ A such that (a1, ..., aK+1) ∈ H. Given a history h, the partial history of
length J is denoted by hJ = (a1, ..., aJ) where J ≤ K . The set of actions which are
available after a non-terminal history h is denoted by Ah. Thus A = ∪h∈HAh. Let Z be
the set of terminal histories. The player function P assigns a member in N to each non-
terminal history; P (h), h ∈ HZ, is the player who chooses an action after the history h.
Let I i be a partition of the set {h : P (h) = i} and I i be a member of I i with the property
that Ah = Ah′ =: AIi for h, h
′ ∈ I i. Thus I i is an information set of player i and I i is the
1I follow the notation of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)
82
set of player i’s information sets. Let I = ∪i∈NI i denote the set of information sets for
all players, which is a partition of non-terminal histories. Note that if any I ∈ I consists
of a single history, then the extensive form game is the one with perfect information. Let
pi : Z → RM be a payoff function which assigns payoffs of all players to each terminal
history and pii be a payoff function for player i.
In this chapter, I restrict our attention to extensive form games with perfect recall. Let
Ih be the information set which contains h. Let I ih denote the set of player i’ information
sets which are reached by h = (a1, ..., ak): I ih = {Ih′ : h′ is a partial history of h and
P (h′) = i}. Let lih : {1, 2, ..., |I ih|} → I ih be a function which orders the information sets
in I ih in the way in which the information sets are reached. Let alih : {1, 2, ..., |I ih|} → A
be the function such that player i’s actions taken at information sets in I ih are ordered as
they occur1. Then the extensive form game has perfect recall if for each i ∈ N, I ih = I ih′ ,
l ih = l
i
h′ and alih = alih′
if h ∈ I i and h′ ∈ I i for some I i ∈ I i.
Letting 4(A) = {x ∈ R|A| : xi ≥ 0 ∀i and
∑
i∈A xi = 1}, a behavioural strategy of
player i is a function βi satisfying βi(I i) ∈ 4(AIi) for all I i ∈ I i. Thus βi(I i) assigns
probabilities over available actions at the information set I i and βi(I i)(a) is the probability
that player i assigns to action a ∈ AIi at his information set I i.
4.2.1 Finitely Repeated Games
I now consider a specific case of an extensive form game, a T times repeated game, in
which a fixed game is played at each round t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, where the game is allowed
to be an extensive form game with perfect information or a normal form game. Let
1If Ih ∈ Ii, then alih(|Iih|) := ∅
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ht, t ∈ T ∪ {0}, be a history of actions chosen by players until round t : h0 = ∅ and
ht = (a1,1, ..., a1,K1 , a2,1, ..., a2,K2 , a3,1, ..., at,Kt), where as,k is k - th action taken at round s
and as,Ks is the action taken at the end of s-th round. Let Ht be the set of histories until
round t. Let I it represent an information set of player i at round t. Let ht,T ∈ H be the
partial history of hT = (a1,1, ..., aT,KT ) until round t; ht,T = (a1,1, ..., at,Kt). Let ht\s−1,T
be a partial history of hT from period s to period t; ht\s−1,T = (as,1, as,2, ..., at,Kt).
Let piis,hT , s ≤ T, be the realized payoff of player i at round s given a terminal history
hT ∈ Z. Let pii(hT ) = piihT =
∑T
s=1 pi
i
s,hT
be the total payoff of player i given the history
hT
1, while piis≥t,hT =
∑T
s=t pi
i
s,hT
be the partial payoff of player i from round t to round T .
4.3 Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept for an extensive form game with payoff perturbations, the agent
quantal response equilibrium, is introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). To state
the concept here formally, I first consider the agent normal form Γ′ = (N ′, H, P, I, pi).
N ′ = N × I is the set of agents each of whom is assigned to a single information set.
j = (i, I i) ∈ N ′ is the agent who serves for player i at information set I i and jt = (i, I it)
is the agent who serves for player i at information set I it at round t. After a terminal
history hT is realized, agent j = (i, I
i) , I i ∈ I ihT , receives payoff pijhT =
∑
s≤T pi
i
s,hT
.
Let pijβ be the expected payoff of agent j given behavioural strategies β = (β
j)j, where
for j = (i, I i), βj = βi(I i). Let ZIi be the set of terminal histories which pass the
information set I i: ZIi = {h ∈ Z : there exists a partial history h′ of h s.t. h′ ∈ I i}.
1It can be also defined as follows; piihT =
∑T
s=1(δ
i)s−1piis,hT , where δ
i is player i’s discount factor for
future payoffs. Now let p˜iis,hT = (δ
i)s−1piis,hT . Then the total payoff that player i receives given history
hT is also defined by pi
i
hT
=
∑
s≤T p˜i
i
s,hT
and I use this expression in this chapter.
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Let β(hT ) represent the probability that hT occurs under agents’ behavioural strategies
β and βI(hT ) be the conditional probability of hT given that information set I is reached
: βI(hT ) =
β(hT )∑
h∈ZI β(h)
if β(ZI) :=
∑
h∈ZI β(h) > 0. Then pi
j
β =
∑
hT∈ZIi βIi(hT )pi
j
hT
=∑
hT∈ZIi βIi(hT )
∑
s≤T pi
i
s,hT
. Let pij
a,β−j be the expected payoff of agent j when he chooses
action a and the others follow behavioural strategy β−j.
Now each agent chooses an action which has the highest expected payoff given some
payoff perturbations. Let Cja be a probability that agent j chooses a ∈ AIi . Then agent
j’s choice probability of action a given behavioural strategy β is as follows;
Cja(pi
j
β) = Pr
(
arg max
b∈AIi
(pij
b,β−j + 
j
b) = a
)
,
where the random vector j = (ja)a∈AIi represents agent j’s payoff perturbations and the
following conditions are assumed: (i) j takes a value in R|AIi |, (ii) the distribution of
the stochastic perturbations has a density which is strictly positive on its domain, (iii)
(j)j is independent, and (iv) the expected value of 
j
a exists for each j and a ∈ AIi .
Now I provide the equilibrium concept for extensive form games, which is introduced by
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998);
Definition. The behavioural strategy profile β∗ = (β1∗, ..., βM∗) in an extensive form
game Γ is an agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE) if it is a normal form quantal
response equilibrium of the agent normal form Γ′ = (N ′, H, P, I, pi) : βi∗(I i)(a) = βj∗(a) =
Cja(pi
j
β∗) for a ∈ AIi and j = (i, I i) ∈ N ′.
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) show the existence of an AQRE;
Proposition (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998). For any Γ, an AQRE exists
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One well-known choice probability form, which is derived by i.i.d. perturbations with
the extreme value distribution F (ja) = exp(− exp(− 1τ ja)), is the logit choice rule;
Cja(pi
j
β) =
exp( 1
τ
pij
a,β−j)∑
b∈AIi exp(
1
τ
pij
b,β−j)
,
where τ is called noise term1. If τ goes to infinity, then the choice probability becomes the
uniform distribution, while if τ approaches 0, then the choice probability approaches the
degenerate probability where the probability of the action which has the highest expected
payoff is 1.
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) have called the AQRE under the stochastic disturbance
with the extreme value distribution logit-AQRE. They show that when the noise term τ
goes to 0, then the logit-AQRE converges to a sequential equilibrium strategy profile.
Proposition (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998). For every finite extensive form game,
every limit point of a sequence of logit-AQRE with τ going to zero corresponds to the
strategy of a sequential equilibrium assessment of the game.
4.4 Assessment and Decision Rule
I now consider the decision rule of adaptive players in an extensive form game. I assume
that the players assign assessments on their own actions available after each non-terminal
history. Let Qin,h : Ah → R be player i’s subjective assessment function in period n,
where the function assigns a subjective assessment to each action available after history
h; Qin,h(a), a ∈ Ah, is the assessment of player i’s action a after the history h in period n.
1See Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)
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I assume that for any I i ∈ I i and h, h′ ∈ I i, Qin,h(a) = Qin,h′(a) =: Qin,Ii(a) for any period
n ∈ N and a ∈ AIi .
Before a player makes a decision, the assessment of each action is affected by stochastic
perturbation, which is interpreted as temporary emotional noise on the assessment; the
random vector ηiIi = (η
i
Ii,a)a∈AIi takes a value in R
|AIi| and the distribution of ηiIi does not
depend on the history, payoffs, or assessments of players. This emotional noise captures
the idea that humans may not always pick the best-performed action; it also captures the
probabilistic choice behaviour of humans.
Each player chooses the action which has the highest subjective assessment affected by
the noise; the probability with which player i chooses action a ∈ AIi given his assessments
and noise is as follows: for h ∈ I i,
Cih,a(Q
i
n) = C
i
Ii,a(Q
i
n) = Pr
(
arg max
b∈AIi
(Qin,Ii(b) + η
i
Ii,b) = a
)
,
where CiIi,a : R
|Ah| → [0, 1] is the probability of choosing action a ∈ AIi . I assume that
for i ∈ N and I i, the distribution of the stochastic noise has a density which is strictly
positive on its domain and thus CiIi,a becomes a continuous function almost surely
1.
If I assume i.i.d. emotional noise with the extreme value distribution then again we
have the logit choice rule;
CiIi,a(Q
i
n) =
exp( 1
τ
Qin,Ii(a))∑
b∈AIi exp(
1
τ
Qi
n,Ii
(b))
.
1For example, consider the case where ηi = 0 with probability one for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Then if Q1 = Q2,
then the choice probability that the agent chooses i depends on his tie break rule and Ci may become a
correspondence.
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4.4.1 Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information
In this subsection, I investigate the case where each stage game in a finitely repeated game
consists of an extensive form game with perfect information. Therefore, each information
set is a singleton. I first introduce the updating rule of assessments for this case; I consider
the updating rule which is introduced by Sarin and Vahid (1999) (SV, hereafter). If a
terminal history hT is realized, then the assessment of action a is updated as follows; for
a history h and a ∈ Ah
Qin+1,h(a) = Q
i
n,h(a) + λn+11h,a(pi
i
hT
−Qin,h(a))
where (1) 1h,a is an indicator function such that 1h,a = 1 if history h is realized and a is
chosen after history h and 0 otherwise, (2) {λn}n∈N is a sequence of weighting parameters,
which is a deterministic sequence and satisfies the following conditions1;
∑
n≥1
λn =∞,
∑
n≥1
(λn)
2 <∞.
Proposition 14. If in infinitely many periods, players play a finitely repeated game in
which each stage game consists of an extensive form game with perfect information and
players follow the SV updating rule, then their behavioural strategy profiles converge to
the unique AQRE of the game almost surely.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is obvious from the proof of Proposition 14 that the behavioural strategies of adap-
tive players converge to the AQRE when the stage game is repeated only once;
1See Chapter 2 for the idea of the conditions
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Corollary 5. When adaptive players with the SV updating rule play an extensive form
game with perfect information in infinitely repeated periods, then their behavioural strate-
gies converge to the unique AQRE of the game with probability one.
4.4.2 Normal Form Games
In this subsection, I consider the case where each stage game of a finitely repeated game
consists of a normal form game. Thus the stage game consists of (1) the set of players N ,
(2) the set of actions Ai available to player i for each i ∈ N , and (3) the payoff function
of player i, pii :
∏
iA
i → R, for each i ∈ N .
The updating rule adopted in this subsection is akin to the one in Q-learning model,
especially for the situation where a normal form game is repeated T times. At the end
of each period, the assessment of the chosen action at each round is adjusted toward the
sum of a payoff received at the round and the highest estimated payoff that the player
can receive after the round. In detail, when a terminal history hT ∈ Z is realized, the
assessment of action at at information set I
i, Qi
n+1,Iit
(at), is updated in the following
manner; for t ≤ T − 1,
Qin+1,Iit
(at) = Q
i
n,Iit
(at)
+ λn+11Iit ,at
(
piit,hT + maxat+1∈Ai
Qin,Iit+1,hT
(at+1)−Qin,Iit (at)
)
,
where (1) 1Iit ,at is an indicator function such that 1Iit ,at = 1 if I
i
t is reached and at
is chosen and 0 otherwise; and (2) I it+1,hT is the information set at round t + 1 which is
reached by hT . For the assessment of action aT at information set I
i
T , the updating rule
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is as follows;
Qin+1,IiT
(aT ) = Q
i
n,IiT
(aT ) + λn+11IiT ,aT (pi
i
T,hT
−Qin,IiT (aT )).
The sequence of weighting parameters, {λn}n, is again assumed to be a deterministic
sequence satisfying the following conditions;
∑
n≥1
λn =∞,
∑
n≥1
(λn)
2 <∞.
To show convergence to an AQRE in this case, I need to introduce some notation.
Consider the case where a normal form game is played once in each of infinitely many
periods. Let piC = (pi
i
C)i : R
∑
i|Ai| → R
∑
i|Ai| be a function which gives players’ expected
payoffs given players’ assessments: piiC(Q) = (pi
i
C(Q)(a))a∈Ai is player i’s expected payoffs
for his actions, where the expected payoffs are obtained by players’ choice probabilities
C and assessments Q = (Qia)i,a. It is shown by Cominetti et al. (2010) that players’
choice probabilities converge to the unique quantal response equilibrium if the stage game
is repeated only once and piC is a ‖·‖∞− contraction;
Lemma (Cominetti et al. 2010, Theorem 4, p75 ). If piC is a ‖·‖∞− contraction
and a normal form game is repeated only once in each of infinitely repeated periods, then
players’ behavioural strategy profiles converge to the unique quantal response equilibrium
almost surely.
I now assume that for any i ∈ N and a ∈ Ai, action a’s emotional noise for all histories
have an identical distribution. Note that it is still allowed for the distributions of the noise
to be different among players and actions. For example, the case where i.i.d noise with
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the extreme value distribution is assumed to obtain the logistic choice rule satisfies this
assumption. Cominetti et al. (2010) show that under a logistic choice rule, piC is a ‖·‖∞−
contraction if the noise term is big enough or the difference of player’s payoff when other
player changes his action is small enough.
Now I show that when the stage game is repeated finitely many times, players’ be-
havioural strategies converge to the agent quantal response equilibrium of the game with
probability one.
Proposition 15. Assume that players play a finitely repeated game in infinitely many
periods. Then with probability one, players’ behavioural strategy profiles converge to the
unique AQRE if (i) each stage game consists of a normal form game, (ii) players follow
Q-learning updating rule, and (iii) piC is a ‖·‖∞− contraction.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.5 Finitely Repeated Games without Emotional Noise
In this section, I assume that in each period, players play a finitely repeated game where
each stage game consists of a normal form game. I also assume that players do not
experience noise on their assessments. Therefore, in any period, each player chooses an
action which has the highest subjective assessment1: for any i ∈ N , I i ∈ I i, h ∈ I i,
n ∈ N,
sin(h) = arg max
a∈Ai
Qin,Ii(a),
1I do not assume a specific tie break rule for players here. I may assume that players pick uniformly
one of actions which have the highest subjective assessment. However, the results in this section do not
depend on the assumption on tie break rule.
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where sin is a strategy of player i in period n, which specifies the action at each of his own
information sets.
I assume that players follow the Q-learning updating rule with {λin}i,n being a random
sequence where (i) λin ∈ (0, 1) for all i and n, (ii) {λin}i,n is i.i.d. among players and periods
and (iii) Prob(λin ∈ J) > 0 for any interval J for all i and n 1.
I assume that the initial assessment of each action for each player satisfies the following
condition; for I it with a
i
s being the action taken by player i at round s,
Qi1,Iit
(ait) > min
a−it ∈A−i
piit(a
i
t, a
−i
t ) + max
(ais)
T
s=t+1
min
(a−is )Ts=t+1
T∑
s=t+1
piis(a
i
s, a
−i
s )
and
Qi1,IiT
(aiT ) > min
a−iT ∈A−i
piiT (a
i
T , a
−i
T ).
The conditions say that the initial assessment of an action is strictly greater than the
minimum payoff from the action. The conditions also exclude trivial cases where the
assessment of each action is lower than the minimum payoff from the action so that
players play the strategy profile which is chosen in the first period in the subsequent
periods.
I first consider the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, which has the following stage
game payoff matrix:
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate pi1CC ,pi
2
CC pi
1
CD,pi
2
DC
Defect pi1DC ,pi
2
CD pi
1
DD,pi
2
DD
where piiDC > pi
i
CC > pi
i
DD > pi
i
CD. In the following Proposition, I show that if the
1See Chapter 3 for the ideas of these assumptions
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payoff piiCD is low enough, then players end up playing a strategy profile in which players
show mutual cooperation or defection at each round. To show that, I introduce some
technical notations.
Let (si, s−i) :
⋃
tHt \ Z → Ai × A−i be the strategy profile of player i and −i where
(si, s−i)(h) = (si(h), s−i(h, si(h))). Let Sa,b denote the set of strategy profiles such that
1. (si, s−i)(h0) = (a1, a1),
2. (si, s−i)((a1, a1)) = (a2, a2), and
3. (si, s−i)((a1, a1, a2, a2, ..., at−1, at−1)) = (at, at) where at ∈ A = {a, b} for any t ∈
T = {1, 2, ..., T}.
This means that players always pick (a, a) or (b, b), coordinate on the same action, at
on-path games. Using the notations above, the following result is shown:
Proposition 16. With T = {1, 2, ..., T},
Pr({ lim
n→∞
(sin, s
−i
n ) = (s
i∗, s−i∗) where (si∗, s−i∗) ∈ SC,D}) = 1
if piiCD + (T − t)piiCC < (T − t+ 1)piiDD, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀t ∈ T.
Proof. See Appendix.
It shows that if payoff from piiCD is low enough, then player i will not sacrifice one-
round payoff for the future payoffs and mutual cooperation or mutual defection is achieved
at each round.
I next consider the case where each stage game consists of a 2× 2 coordination game.
For instance, the stag hunt game has the following payoff matrix;
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Stag Rabbit
Stag pi1SS, pi
2
SS pi
1
SR, pi
2
RS
Rabbit pi1RS, pi
2
SR pi
1
RR, pi
2
RR
where piiSS > pi
i
RS ≥ piiRR > piiSR for i ∈ {1, 2}. In general, a 2× 2 normal form game
a b
a pi1aa, pi
2
aa pi
1
ab, pi
2
ba
b pi1ba, pi
2
ab pi
1
bb, pi
2
bb
is a coordination game if piiaa > pi
i
ba and pi
i
bb > pi
i
ab for i ∈ {1, 2}. I now restrict my attention
to specific 2×2 coordination games where (i) all off-diagonal payoffs for both players are
the same or (ii) at each off-diagonal action profile, there exists one player who receives the
worst payoff. The battle of the sexes game, the stag hunt game, and a pure coordination
game are examples of the coordination games, where Chapter 3 shows that players end
up playing a pure Nash equilibrium in the long run1 if these games are repeated only once
in each period. It can be also shown from Proposition 16 that in the long run, players
succeed to cooperate in each stage game if the stage game is repeated more than once,
but finite times, in each period. Let ki := arg maxa∈A piia,a and l
i 6= ki where li ∈ A. Then
from the argument of Proposition 16, it is easy to show the condition under which mutual
cooperation is achieved in a finitely repeated coordination;
Corollary 6. Consider the case in which players play a 2×2 coordination game T times in
each period where at least one player receives the worst payoff at each non-Nash equilibrium
1There are some cases that players may not end up playing pure Nash equilibrium in some modification
of the battle of the sexes game. Here, I consider the standard version of the battle of the sexes game.
For details, see Chapter 3.
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profile in the stage game. With T = {1, 2, ..., T},
Pr({ lim
n→∞
(sin, s
−i
n ) = (s
i∗, s−i∗) where (si∗, s−i∗) ∈ Sa,b}) = 1
if
min(piia,b, pi
i
b,a) + (T − t)piiki,ki < (T − t+ 1)piili,li
∀i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ T.
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, I consider adaptive players who follow Q-learning and SV updating rules.
I show that players’ behavioural strategy profiles converge to a unique agent quantal re-
sponse equilibrium when temporal emotional noise affects their assessments. If there is no
noise on their assessments, then both players (1) show mutual cooperation or defection at
each stage game in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma and (2) succeed to coordinate
at each stage game in finitely repeated coordination games.
Note that players in this chapter assign subjective assessments on actions which follow
any history. If the size of extensive form game becomes bigger, then it may be difficult
for players to remember all assessments. Then it may be reasonable for players to group
some information sets and assign representative assessments to actions available in the
group. The analysis for such a case is left for future research.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Proposition 14
Proposition 14. If at each of infinitely repeated periods, players play a finitely repeated
game in which each stage game consists of an extensive form game with perfect infor-
mation and players follow the SV updating rule, then their behavioural strategy profiles
converge to the unique AQRE of the game almost surely.
Noteh that the uniqueness of the AQRE of the game is due to the assumption of the
stochastic emotional noise; it is assumed that the density of the stochastic noise for each
action’s assessment is strictly positive on its domain. For the details, see McKelvey and
Palfrey (1998).
I now show that the behavioural strategies of players converge to the AQRE. It can
be shown that any subgame can be reached infinitely often with probability one. Then
it is shown by backward induction that at each subgame the assessment of each action
converges to the AQRE payoff from the action so that the behavioural strategy of each
player in the limit corresponds to the AQRE behavioural strategy.
First, I consider a history which requires one more action to be a terminal history;
let hK−1 = (a1, ..., aK−1) be a history such that (a1, ...., aK−1, a) ∈ Z for some action
a ∈ AhK−1 , where AhK−1 is the set of actions available after history hK−1. Then the
updating rule of the assessment of the action a ∈ AhK−1 is as follows;
Qin+1,hK−1(a) = Q
i
n,hK−1(a) + λn+11hK−1,a(pi
i
hK−1,a −Qin,hK−1(a)),
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where hK−1, a := (a1, ..., aK−1, a) is a terminal history. Notice that the payoff piihK−1,a
is constant. Therefore, it is obvious that with probability one, Qin,hK−1(a) converges to
piihK−1,a =: F
i∗
hK−1(a) almost surely. Note that the choice probability of the action of player
i after history hK−1 in the limit corresponds to the probability which is derived by the
quantal response equilibrium strategy of player i after hK−1, βi∗(hK−1)(a).
Next, I consider the assessment of an action a ∈ AhK−2 which follows history hK−2
such that the longest terminal history which contains history hK−2, a := (a1, ...., aK−2, a)
as a partial history has the length of K. Then the updating rule of the action is as follows:
Qin+1,hK−2(a) = Q
i
n,hK−2(a) + λn+11hK−2,a(pi
i
hK−2,a −Qin,hK−2(a)), (4.1)
where piihK−2,a is defined as follows;
piihK−2,a =
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
1a′|hK−2,api
i
hK−2,a,a′ ,
where (1) 1a′|hK−2,a = 1 if given the event that history hK−2, a is realized, a
′ is chosen and
0 otherwise, (2)hK−2, a, a′ := (a1, ..., aK−2, a, a′). Now I define F i∗hK−2(a) in the following
manner;
F i∗hK−2(a) =
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
Cj(Qj∗hK−2,a)(a
′)piihK−2,a,a′
=
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
Cj(Qj∗hK−2,a)(a
′)F i∗hK−2,a,a′
where j = P (hK−2, a) and (Q
j∗
hK−2,a(a
′))a′∈Aj is agent j’s limit assessments, which is
(pijhK−2,a,a′)a′∈AhK−2,a . Therefore, (C
j(Qj∗hK−2,a)(a
′))a′∈AhK−2,a corresponds to player j’s AQRE
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behavioural strategy profile. Note that F i∗hK−2(a) is constant for each a ∈ AhK−2 . I can
rewrite the equation (4.1) as follows;
Qin+1,hK−2(a) = Q
i
n,hK−2(a) + λn+11hK−2,a
(
(F i∗hK−2(a)−Qin,hK−2(a))
− (
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
Cj(Qjn,hK−2,a)(a
′)piihK−2,a,a′ −
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
1a′|hK−2,api
i
hK−2,a,a′)
− (F i∗hK−2(a)−
∑
a′∈AK−2,a
Cj(Qjn,hK−2,a)(a
′)piihK−2,a,a′)
)
.
Since the term in the second line is martingale difference noise and the term in the last line
converges to 0 almost surely if n goes to infinity, by a stochastic approximation method1,
we know that Qin,hK−2(a)
a.s.→ Qi∗hK−2(a) = F i∗hK−2(a) for a ∈ AhK−2 . Notice that the player
i plays the agent quantal response equilibrium strategy after history hK−2.
Last, I prove for the remaining cases by induction. I first define F i∗hl (a) as follows; for
any l ∈ {1, 2, ..., K − 2},
F i∗hl (a) :=
∑
a′∈Ahl,a
Cj(Qj∗hl,a)(a
′)F i∗hl,a(a
′),
where j = P (hl, a) and F
i
hK−2,a,(a
′) = piihK−2,a,a′ . Since pi
i
hK−2,a,a′ is constant, F
i∗
hl
(a) is also
constant for l ∈ {1, ..., K−3, K−2}. Assuming that for any l ∈ {K−k, ..., K−3, K−2},
hl and a ∈ Ahl , Qin,hl(a)
a.s.→ Qi∗hl(a) = F i∗hl (a), I show that Qin,hK−(k+1)(a)
a.s.→ Qi∗hK−(k+1)(a) =
F i∗hK−(k+1)(a) for a ∈ AhK−(k+1) . Now the updating rule of action a ∈ AhK−(k+1) can be
1For example, the interested reader may refer Chapter 2 in Borkar (2008) for the stochastic approxi-
mation method used in this proof.
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expressed as follows;
Qin+1,hK−(k+1)(a) = Q
i
n,hK−(k+1)(a) + λn+11hK−(k+1),a
(
(F i∗hK−(k+1)(a)−Qin,hK−(k+1)(a))
− (F in,hK−(k+1)(a)−
∑
a′∈Ahk,a
1a′|hK−(k+1),api
i
hK−(k+1),a,a′
)
− (F i∗hK−(k+1)(a)− F in,hK−(k+1)(a))
)
,
where
piihK−(k+1),a,a′ :=
∑
a′′∈AhK−(k+1),a,a′
1a′′|hK−(k+1),a,a′pi
i
hK−(k+1),a,a′,a′′
if hK−(k+1), a, a′ is not a terminal history and
F in,hK−(k+1)(a) :=
∑
a′∈AhK−(k+1),a
Cj(Qjn,hK−(k+1),a)(a
′)F ihl,a(a
′).
Notice that the term in the second line is martingale difference noise. Also notice that
the term in the third line converges to zero almost surely by an induction argument.
Therefore, by a stochastic approximation method, we have Qin,hk(a)
a.s.→ F i∗hk,a for any
a ∈ Ahk .
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 15
Proposition 15. Assume that players play a finitely repeated game in each of infinitely
many periods. Then with probability one, players’ behavioural strategy profiles converge
to the unique AQRE if (i) each stage game consists of a normal form game, (ii) players
follow Q-learning updating rule, and (iii) piC is a ‖·‖∞− contraction.
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I assume the Q-learning updating rule for each player. It can also be shown easily
that any subgame is reached infinitely often with probability one. In this proof, again
backward induction method is used to show that the assessment of each action converges
to the AQRE payoff from the action so that the behavioural strategy of each player in
the limit corresponds to the AQRE behavior strategy.
Now I consider the last subgame which follows some history hT−1 and let I iT be player
i’s information set at the subgame. Note that the last subgame is a one shot normal
form game. Therefore, by the nature of Q-learning updating rule at the last period and
Cominetti et al. (2010), it is shown that behavioural strategies of players converge to
the unique quantal response equilibrium with probability one. In fact, because of the
structure of choice probabilities, the equilibrium behavioural strategies coincide with the
agent quantal response equilibrium behavioural strategies of the finitely repeated game1.
Note that maxbi∈Ai Qin,IiT
(bi) converges to maxbi∈A pii(bi, β
−i,∗
I−iT
) almost surely, where β−i,∗
I−it
,
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, is player −i’s quantal response equilibrium behavioural strategy at I−it .
Note that the distribution of the emotional noise of an action and the stage games at
round T do not depend on history. Thus for any information set of each player at the last
subgame, I iT , let βT = (βIiT )i be a behavioural strategy profile at round T.
I next consider a stage game in period T −1. Then the updating rule of an assessment
of player i at round T − 1 is as follows; letting I iT−1 be player i’s information set at the
stage game and history hT being realized,
Qin+1,IiT−1
(ai) = Qin,IiT−1
(ai) + λn+11IiT−1,ai(pi
i
T−1,hT + maxbi∈Ai
Qin,IiT,hT
(bi)−Qin,IiT−1(a
i)).
1Note that the choice probability at some subgame depends on the differences among expected payoffs
from actions available at the game. Also, notice that at the last subgame, the differences are determined
by the payoffs from the game.
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Since maxbi∈Ai Qin,IiT
(bi) converges to maxbi∈Ai pii(bi, β
−i,∗
T ) almost surely, it is shown that
they are approximated by the following ordinary differential equations;
Q˙iτ,IiT−1
(ai) = CIiT−1,ai(Qτ )(pi
i
T−1(a
i, β−iT−1) +K
i
T −Qiτ,hT−2(ai)), ai ∈ Ai,
where (i) CI,a(Q) is a probability which is derived by players’ choice probabilities and
assessments Q, of the realization of I and a; and (ii) KiT = maxbi∈Ai pi
i(bi, β−i,∗T ). Note
that CIit−1,a(Q) is determined by choice probabilities of players until round t. Now defining
p¯iiT−1 := pi
i
T−1 +K
i
T , we have
Q˙iτ,IiT−1
(ai) = CIiT−1,ai(Qτ )(p¯i
i
T−1(a
i, β−iT−1)−Qiτ,IiT−1(a
i)).
Notice that the game with the payoff function p¯iiT−1 is equivalent to the stage game. It
is also easy to show that p¯iC , which is players’ expected payoffs for all actions derived
by p¯iiT−1 for each i, is also a ‖·‖∞− contraction if piC is a ‖·‖∞− contraction. Then by
Cominetti et al. (2010), player i’ behavioural strategies converge to the agent quantal
response equilibrium strategy and Qi
n,IiT−1
(ai) converges to pii(ai, β−i,∗T−1)+K
i
T almost surely,
where β−i,∗T−1 is player −i’s agent quantal response equilibrium strategy at round T − 11
. Notice that letting KiT−1 := maxai pi
i(ai, β−i,∗T−1) + K
i
T , maxbi∈AQ
i
n,IiT−1
(bi) converges to
KiT−1 almost surely.
Now I prove for the other cases by backward induction. I assume that Qi
n,Iit+1
(ai)
converges to pii(ai, β−i,∗t+1 )+K
i
t+2, where K
i
t+2 := maxai pi
i(ai, β−i,∗t+2 )+K
i
t+3 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T−3.
Then we know that maxbi∈Ai Qin,Iit+1(b
i) converges to Kit+1 almost surely. Consider the
1Since the expected payoffs from the last subgames which follow the game are all equivalent, therefore,
again, the differences among expected payoffs of the actions are determined by the payoffs from the game.
101
updating rule of the assessment of action ai at a t-th round stage game when history hT
is realized:
Qin+1,Iit
(ai) = Qin,Iit
(ai) + λn+11Iit ,ai(pi
i
t,hT
+ max
bi∈Ai
Qin,Iit+1,hT
(bi)−Qin,Iit (a
i)).
Since maxbi∈Ai Qin,Iit+1(b
i) converges to Kit+1 almost surely and K
i
t+1 is equal across player
i’s information sets at round t+ 1, by a stochastic approximation method, we have
Q˙iτ,Iit
(ai) = CIit ,ai(Qτ )(pi
i
t(a
i, β−it ) +K
i
t+1 −Qiτ,Iit (a
i)).
By setting p¯ii := pii +Kit+1, we have
Q˙iτ,Iit
(ai) = CIit ,ai(Qτ )(p¯i
i
t(a
i, β−it )−Qiτ,Iit (a
i)).
Since the game with the payoff function p¯ii is equivalent to the stage game, it can be
shown that Qi
n,Iit
(ai) converges to pii(ai, β−i∗t ) + K
i
t+1 where β
−i∗
t is player −i’s agent
quantal response equilibrium strategy.
4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 16
Proposition 16. With T = {1, 2, ..., T},
Pr({ lim
n→∞
(sin, s
−i
n ) = (s
i∗, s−i∗) where (si∗, s−i∗) ∈ SC,D}) = 1
if piiCD + (T − t)piiCC < (T − t+ 1)piiDD, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀t ∈ T.
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First, I consider the simplest case of finitely repeated case where T = {1, 2}. It can
be shown that with probability one, players play (C,C) or (D,D) at any second stage
game, which follows any history if the history is realized infinitely many times1. Note that
(i) (C,C) is the absorbing state of the game and (ii) at off-diagonal action profiles, one
player receives the worst payoff so that players never play the off-diagonal action profiles
infinitely many times.
I now show that players cannot play ((C,D), (D,D)) and ((C,D), (C,C)) infinitely
many times. The intuition of the proof is that the payoff of the player who chooses C at
(C,D) is so low that he does not choose C to receive the better payoff in the nest stage.
I first consider the proof for ((C,D), (D,D)). When ((C,D), (D,D)) is played, the
assessment of action C of player i approaches piiCD +pi
i
DD. While the assessment of action
D at the first period is at least 2piiDD. Therefore, with probability one, the assessment of
action C of player i becomes lower than 2piiDD if ((C,D), (D,D)) is played infinitely many
times and after that, ((C,D), (D,D)) is not played; which contradicts the hypothesis.
Now suppose that ((C,D), (C,C)) is played infinitely many times. Then the assessment
of C of player i at the first period approaches to piiCD + pi
i
CC , while the assessment of
action D is at least 2piiDD. Therefore, with probability one, the assessment of action C
becomes lower than 2piiDD, in which case the player never plays C, which contradicts
the hypothesis. Note that players end up playing one action profile, since the weighting
parameters are i.i.d. random variables among players 2.
Now I show for the general case. It has been shown that at the last round, players end
up playing (C,C) or (D,D) with probability one. To prove this by induction, assume that
1See the argument in Chapter 3 or the main theorem of Sarin (1999).
2See Chapter 3 for detailed argument.
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after round t, players play (C,C) or (D,D). If players play (C,D) at round t infinitely
often, then the assessment of C becomes lower than (T−t+1)piiDD with positive probability
in each of the periods, since
piiCD +
T∑
s=t+1
piit,h′T ≤ pi
i
CD + (T − t)piiCC < (T − t+ 1)piiDD,
where, in the history h′T , players play (C,C) or (D,D) after period t. If (C,D) is played
at round t in infinitely many periods, then the assessment of the C becomes lower than
(T − t+ 1)piiDD with probability one, which contradicts the hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, I investigate the behaviour of adaptive decision makers in the long run in a
decision problem, normal form games, and finitely repeated games. They are assumed to
have limited information, as in many situations in the real world, and assess each action
based on its past payoffs. Given the assessments, each of them chooses the action which
he thinks is the best; the action which has the highest assessment. After receiving payoff
information, they update their assessments adaptively using the information.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the case in which an adaptive decision maker observes
objective payoff information and in addition, obtains foregone payoff information. When
the noise on each assessment is big enough, then with probability one, the assessments
converge to the weighted average of expected objective and distorted payoffs with weights
depending on the limit choice probabilities. It is also shown that he picks the optimal
action most frequently in the long run if expected distorted payoff of the action is greater
than the ones of the other actions. For example, the decision makers in the EWA learning
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model and in the stochastic fictitious play model, which are special cases of this model,
pick the optimal action most frequently in the long run. However, there is a case where
the decision maker chooses a non-optimal action most frequently; it happens when he
distorts the foregone payoff of the action greater than the one of the optimal action.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the case in which adaptive players face a normal form
game with strict Nash equilibria in infinitely many periods. It is shown that players end
up playing a strict Nash equilibrium if (1) at non-Nash equilibrium action profile, there
exists at least one player who can find another action which always gives better payoffs
than his current payoff or (2) each player’s payoffs at all non-Nash equilibrium profiles
are equivalent. For example, the stag hunt game satisfies condition (1) while battle of the
sexes games and pure coordination games satisfy condition (2), meaning that players end
up playing a pure Nash equilibrium in these games. The convergence result is also shown
for the first order statistic game.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the case in which adaptive players play a finitely repeated
game in each of infinitely repeated periods. I consider two updating rules; Q-learning
updating rule and SV updating rule. When each stage game consists of an extensive
form game with perfect information, then players’ behavioural strategies converge to the
agent quantal response equilibrium introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). I also
give a condition, which is from Cominetti et al. (2010), for the convergence when each
stage game consists of a normal form game. While the results are based on the model
with noise on each assessment, I also consider the model without the noise. I show that
when the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma is played, players may end up cooperating
in each stage game, while when they play a finitely repeated coordination game, they end
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up cooperating on one of pure Nash equilibria in each stage game.
In each of these chapters, I also show the conditions under which they may fail to learn
the optimal action in the decision problem, Nash equilibrium in the normal form and
subgame perfect equilibrium in extensive form games. The intuition behind the failure
of learning the optimal action or Nash equilibrium is that (1) the lack of exploration
prevents players from learning the values of actions, where the exploration is caused by
emotional stochastic shocks on players’ assessments and (2) distortion of foregone payoff
information makes a non-optimal action more attractive. However, note that even the
lack of exploration, convergence to Nash equilibrium is shown in Chapter 3.
5.2 Extensions
In Chapter 2, I restrict my attention to a decision problem but the model can be extended
to normal form and extensive form games. It may be interesting to see how the distortion
affects the long run outcomes of learning in games. In Chapter 3, I may consider the
situation where players experience emotional shocks on assessments. In Chapter 4, it is
natural to extend the analysis to more games and learning rules. Also, I may focus on
different aspects of players’ cognitive limitations in adaptive learning. For instance, in
Chapter 4, players assign assessments on actions which follow any history. This seems
adequate if the size of the game is not big, but it may be a problem otherwise, because of
players’ memory limitations. One natural thought is that they may categorize information
sets so that they need to remember only representative assessments of actions in each of
categories of sets. These extensions are left for future research.
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